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 STATE OF NEW YORK 
 PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
 
________________________________________ 
 
In the Matter of 
 
INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF TEAMSTERS,  
LOCAL 693/317, 
 
                                                          Petitioner, 
 
           -and-                                                             CASE NO. C-6310 
 
VILLAGE OF DEPOSIT, 
 
                                                 Employer. 
 
________________________________________ 
 
 
 CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the above matter by the 
Public Employment Relations Board in accordance with the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act and the Rules of Procedure, and it appearing that a negotiating 
representative has been selected; 
Pursuant to the authority vested by the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act; 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 
Local 693/317 has been designated and selected by a majority of the employees of the 
above-named public employer, in the unit agreed upon by the parties and described 
below, as their exclusive representative for the purpose of collective negotiations and 
the settlement of grievances. 
Included: Water/Waste Water Maintenance Crew Chief, Water/Waste Water 
Maintainer, and full-time and part-time Laborer. 
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   Excluded: Town Supervisor, Highway Superintendent, Clerks, and all other 
employees. 
 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer shall 
negotiate collectively with the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Local 693/317.  
The duty to negotiate collectively includes the mutual obligation to meet at reasonable 
times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and 
conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising 
thereunder, and the execution of a written agreement incorporating any agreement 
reached if requested by either party.  Such obligation does not compel either party to 
agree to a proposal or require the making of a concession. 
DATED:  April 13, 2016 
               Albany, New York 
 
        
 
 
                                                                    
 
 STATE OF NEW YORK 
 PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
 
 
________________________________________ 
 
In the Matter of 
 
LOCAL 342, UMD, ILA, AFL-CIO, 
 
                                                          Petitioner, 
 
           -and-                                                             CASE NO. C-6338 
 
NASSAU COUNTY VOCATIONAL EDUCATION & 
EXTENSION BOARD, 
 
                                                 Employer. 
 
________________________________________ 
 
 
 CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the above matter by the 
Public Employment Relations Board in accordance with the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act and the Rules of Procedure, and it appearing that a negotiating 
representative has been selected; 
Pursuant to the authority vested by the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act; 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Local 342, UMD, ILA, AFL-CIO has been 
designated and selected by a majority of the employees of the above-named public 
employer, in the unit agreed upon by the parties and described below, as their exclusive 
representative for the purpose of collective negotiations and the settlement of 
grievances. 
Included: Part-time per diem 2nd Deputy Instructors Nassau County 
Vocational Education & Extension Board. 
Certification - C-6338 - 2 - 
 
 
 
   
   Excluded: All other employees. 
 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer shall 
negotiate collectively with the Local 342, UMD, ILA, AFL-CIO.  The duty to negotiate 
collectively includes the mutual obligation to meet at reasonable times and confer in 
good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment, 
or the negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising thereunder, and the 
execution of a written agreement incorporating any agreement reached if requested by 
either party.  Such obligation does not compel either party to agree to a proposal or 
require the making of a concession. 
DATED:  April 13, 2016 
               Albany, New York 
        
  
 
                                                                    
 
 STATE OF NEW YORK 
 PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
 
________________________________________ 
 
In the Matter of 
 
TRANSPORT WORKERS UNION OF AMERICA,  
LOCAL 100, 
 
                                                          Petitioner, 
 
           -and-                                                             CASE NO. C-6352 
 
MANHATTAN and BRONX SURFACE TRANSIT 
OPERATING AUTHORITY, 
 
                                                 Employer. 
 
________________________________________ 
 
 
 CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the above matter by the 
Public Employment Relations Board in accordance with the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act and the Rules of Procedure, and it appearing that a negotiating 
representative has been selected; 
Pursuant to the authority vested by the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act; 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Transport Workers Union of America, Local 
100 has been designated and selected by a majority of the employees of the above-
named public employer, in the unit agreed upon by the parties and described below, as 
their exclusive representative for the purpose of collective negotiations and the 
settlement of grievances. 
Included: All Computer Aides1, Computer Aides 2, Computer Associates 1, 
Computer Associates 2, Computer Associates 3, Computer 
Certification - C-6352 - 2 - 
 
 
 
Specialists 1, Computer Specialists 2, Computer Specialists 3, 
Computer Specialists 4, Telecommunications Associates 1, 
Telecommunications Associates 2, Telecommunications Associates 
3, Telecommunications Specialist 1, Telecommunications 
Specialists 2, Telecommunications Specialists 3, Computer System 
Managers, Computer Program Analysts 1, and Computer Program 
Analysts 2 employed by the Manhattan and Bronx Surface Transit 
Operating Authority. 
   
   Excluded: Employees who the parties have agreed, in their Agreement dated 
January 8, 2016, perform confidential and/or managerial duties and 
all other employees. 
 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer shall 
negotiate collectively with the Transport Workers Union of America, Local 100.  The 
duty to negotiate collectively includes the mutual obligation to meet at reasonable times 
and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of 
employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising thereunder, 
and the execution of a written agreement incorporating any agreement reached if 
requested by either party.  Such obligation does not compel either party to agree to a 
proposal or require the making of a concession. 
DATED:  April 13, 2016 
               Albany, New York 
                                                                
  
 STATE OF NEW YORK 
 PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
 
__________________________________________ 
 
In the Matter of 
 
UNITED PUBLIC SERVICE EMPLOYEES UNION,     
 
                                                             Petitioner, 
 
                                - and -                         
        CASE NO. C-6363 
 
BRENTWOOD UNION FREE SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
 
                                                             Employer, 
 
-and- 
 
CITY EMPLOYEES UNION LOCAL 237, INTERNATIONAL  
BROTHERHOOD OF TEAMSTERS, 
 
       Intervenor/Incumbent. 
__________________________________________ 
 
KOEHLER & ISSACS LLP (JULIE PEARLMAN SCHATZ, ESQ., of Counsel), 
for Petitioner 
 
LAMB & BARNOSKY, LLP (RICHARD K. ZUCKERMAN, ESQ., of Counsel), 
for Employer 
 
ARCHER, BYINGTON, GLENNON & LEVINE, LLP (JAMES W. VERSOCKI, 
ESQ, of Counsel), for Intervenor 
 
 BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
 
On November 3, 2015, the United Public Service Employees Union (petitioner) 
filed, in accordance with the Rules of Procedure of the Public Employment Relations 
Board, a timely petition seeking certification as the exclusive representative of certain 
employees of the Brentwood Union Free School District (employer). 
Thereafter, the parties executed a consent agreement in which they stipulated 
that the following negotiating unit was appropriate: 
Included: All permanent Custodial Worker I, Groundskeeper I, Custodial 
Worker II, Driver Messenger, Maintenance Mechanic I, Audio 
Visual Aide, Head Custodian, Maintenance Mechanic II, Chief 
Custodian, Audio Visual Technician, Automotive Mechanic III, 
Maintenance Mechanic III (carpenter, electrician, electronic 
technician, heating and refrigeration, locksmith, plumber), 
Groundskeeper II, Head Maintenance, Stock Clerk, Storekeeper, 
Guard, Senior Guard, Food Service Worker, Cook and Substitute 
Guard (also known as Call-In Guard) employed by the Board of 
Education. 
 
Excluded: Substitute part-time employees, clerical employees and all other 
employees. 
 
Pursuant to that agreement, a secret-ballot election was held on March 18, 2016, 
at which a majority of ballots were cast against representation by the petitioner. 
Inasmuch as the results of the election indicate that a majority of the eligible 
voters in the unit who cast ballots do not desire to be represented for the purpose of 
collective negotiations by the petitioner, the incumbent remains the exclusive 
representative of the unit employees and IT IS ORDERED that the petition is dismissed. 
 
DATED:  April 13, 2016 
               Albany, New York 
 
       
                      
 
 STATE OF NEW YORK 
 PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
 
__________________________________________ 
 
In the Matter of 
 
UNITED PUBLIC SERVICE EMPLOYEES UNION,     
 
                                                             Petitioner, 
 
                               - and -                                CASE NO. C-6364 
 
MIDDLE COUNTRY CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
 
                                                             Employer, 
 
 
-and- 
 
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, INC., 
LOCAL 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 
 
       Intervenor/Incumbent. 
__________________________________________ 
 
JULIE PEARLMAN SCHATZ, ESQ., for Petitioner 
 
THOMAS M. VOLZ, ESQ., for Employer 
 
ERIC WILKE, ESQ., for Intervenor 
 
 BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
 
On November 3, 2015, the United Public Service Employees Union (petitioner) 
filed, in accordance with the Rules of Procedure of the Public Employment Relations 
Board, a timely petition seeking certification as the exclusive representative of certain 
employees of the Middle Country Central School District (employer). 
Thereafter, the parties executed a consent agreement in which they stipulated 
that the following negotiating unit was appropriate: 
Included: All employees in the titles of Bus Driver Mechanic; Material 
Control Clerk 1, 2 and 3; Bus/Auto Mechanic 1, 2 and 3; 
Maintenance Mechanic 2, 3 and 4; Head Bus Driver; 
Groundsperson; and Head Groundsperson (Grounds Foreman). 
 
Excluded: All other employees. 
 
Pursuant to that agreement, a secret-ballot election was held on February 19, 
2016, at which a majority of ballots were cast against representation by the petitioner. 
Inasmuch as the results of the election indicate that a majority of the eligible 
voters in the unit who cast ballots do not desire to be represented for the purpose of 
collective negotiations by the petitioner, the incumbent remains the exclusive 
representative of the unit employees and IT IS ORDERED that the petition is dismissed. 
 
DATED:  April 13, 2016 
               Albany, New York 
 
       
                      
 
 STATE OF NEW YORK 
 PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
 
__________________________________________ 
 
In the Matter of 
 
UNITED PUBLIC SERVICE EMPLOYEES UNION,     
 
                                                             Petitioner, 
 
       - and -                                CASE NO. C-6365 
 
MIDDLE COUNTRY CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
 
                                                             Employer, 
 
 
-and- 
 
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, INC., 
LOCAL 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 
 
       Intervenor/Incumbent. 
__________________________________________ 
 
JULIE PEARLMAN SCHATZ, ESQ., for Petitioner 
 
THOMAS M. VOLZ, ESQ., for Employer 
 
ERIC WILKE, ESQ., for Intervenor 
 
 BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
 
On November 3, 2015, the United Public Service Employees Union (petitioner) 
filed, in accordance with the Rules of Procedure of the Public Employment Relations 
Board, a timely petition seeking certification as the exclusive representative of certain 
employees of the Middle Country Central School District (employer). 
Thereafter, the parties executed a consent agreement in which they stipulated 
that the following negotiating unit was appropriate: 
Included: All supervisory employees of the Buildings and Grounds 
Department whose titles are Chief Custodians and Head 
Custodians shall be a part of and included in this bargaining unit. 
 
Excluded: All other employees. 
 
Pursuant to that agreement, a secret-ballot election was held on February 19, 
2016, at which a majority of ballots were cast against representation by the petitioner. 
Inasmuch as the results of the election indicate that a majority of the eligible 
voters in the unit who cast ballots do not desire to be represented for the purpose of 
collective negotiations by the petitioner, the incumbent remains the exclusive 
representative of the unit employees and IT IS ORDERED that the petition is dismissed. 
 
DATED:  April 13, 2016 
               Albany, New York 
 
       
 
                      
 
 STATE OF NEW YORK 
 PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
 
 
________________________________________ 
 
In the Matter of 
 
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, LOCAL 
1000, AFSCME, ALF-CIO, 
 
                                                          Petitioner, 
 
           -and-                                                             CASE NO. C-6372 
 
AVERILL PARK CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
 
                                                 Employer, 
 
           -and- 
 
UNITED PUBLIC SERVICE EMPLOYEES UNION, 
 
                                                          Intervenor/Incumbent. 
 
________________________________________ 
 
 
 CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the above matter by the 
Public Employment Relations Board in accordance with the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act and the Rules of Procedure, and it appearing that a negotiating 
representative has been selected; 
Pursuant to the authority vested by the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act; 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Civil Service Employees Association, Local 
1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO has been designated and selected by a majority of the 
employees of the above-named public employer, in the unit agreed upon by the parties 
Certification - C-6372 - 2 - 
 
 
 
and described below, as their exclusive representative for the purpose of collective 
negotiations and the settlement of grievances. 
Included: All full-time and part-time employees in the titles listed to be 
included in the negotiating unit: 12-month Mechanic, Account Clerk, 
Assistant Cook, Building Maintenance Mechanic, Bus Attendant, 
Bus Driver, Cook, Custodial Worker, Custodians, Dispatcher, Food 
Service Helper, Groundskeeper, Head Groundskeeper, Messenger, 
School Monitor, Senior Typist, Teacher Aide, Typist, Typist 
assigned to a Principal and Typist assigned to an 
Admin/Supervisor. 
   
   Excluded: All other employees. 
 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer shall 
negotiate collectively with the Civil Service Employees Association, Local 1000, 
AFSCME, AFL-CIO.  The duty to negotiate collectively includes the mutual obligation to 
meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and 
other terms and conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or any 
question arising thereunder, and the execution of a written agreement incorporating any 
agreement reached if requested by either party.  Such obligation does not compel either 
party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a concession. 
DATED:  April 13, 2016 
               Albany, New York 
  
   STATE OF NEW YORK 
 PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
__________________________________________ 
 
In the Matter of  
 
VILLAGE OF SCARSDALE,     
                                                      Petitioner, 
CASE NO. CP-1352 
                  - and -                                                                    
 
UNIFORMED FIREFIGHTERS ASSOCIATION OF  
SCARSDALE, LOCAL 1394, IAFF, AFL-CIO, 
 
                                                      Employer. 
__________________________________________ 
 
BOND, SCHOENECK & KING, PLLC (TERRY O'NEIL of counsel), for 
Petitioner 
 
MEYER, SOUZZI, ENGLISH & KLEIN, P.C. (RICHARD S. CORENTHAL of 
counsel), for Employer 
 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
 
 This comes to us on exceptions by the Village of Scarsdale (Village) to a decision 
of an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) dismissing the Village’s unit placement petition 
filed pursuant to § 201.2(b) of our Rules of Procedure (Rules) asking that the newly-
created title of Fire Lieutenant be included in the pre-existing bargaining unit 
represented by the Uniformed Firefighters Association of Scarsdale, Local 1394, IAFF, 
AFL-CIO (UFA).1  For the reasons stated herein, we affirm the ALJ’s decision, deny the 
exceptions, and dismiss the petition. 
EXCEPTIONS  
 We characterize the Village’s eight exceptions as follows:  (1) the Village excepts 
to the ALJ’s factual findings and conclusions that the vacancy in the Fire Lieutenant 
position cannot be said to be “temporary” because it had never been filled, that there 
                                                     
1 48 PERB ¶ 4001 (2015). 
Case No. CP-1352 
  -2- 
 
was no date certain when the Village would fill the position, and indeed, the Village had 
never made any efforts to fill the position;2  (2) the Village excepts to the ALJ’s findings 
that “it cannot ‘be said that the duties of the position [at issue herein] are known in this 
matter’”;3 and (3) the Village generally excepts to the ALJ’s dismissal of the petition and 
application of case law to the facts before her.4 
FACTS 
 The parties asked the ALJ to determine this matter on a stipulated record in lieu 
of a hearing;5 therefore these facts are not at issue.  The ALJ incorporated the relevant 
facts from that record into her decision, and we restate them as necessary to determine 
the exceptions before us.   
 UFA represents a unit of six Fire Captains and thirty-nine Firefighters employed 
in the Village’s Fire Department (Department).  The most recent collective bargaining 
agreement between the parties runs from June 1, 2013 through May 31, 2017 and 
contains the following recognition clause:    
This Agreement shall apply to permanent, paid, full time Fire 
Captains and Fire Fighters of the uniformed force of the Fire 
Department of the Village, Probationary Fire Captains and to 
Probationary Firefighters upon their successful completion of 
fire academy training and their passing the Candidate 
Physical Ability Test (collectively “Employees”).  This 
Agreement shall not apply to the Fire Chief and all 
others not contained in this paragraph.6 
 
 The Westchester County Department of Human Resources (DHR) certified a job 
                                                     
2 Exceptions, ¶¶ 3, 6, and 7. 
3 Exceptions, ¶ 4. 
4 Exceptions, ¶¶ 1, 2, and 5. 
5 Response of UFA to Exceptions, Ex. A (Stipulation of Facts or SOF) which contain as 
exhibits all of the documents referred to herein. 
6 SOF, ¶¶ 1 and 2 (emphasis added). 
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description for a newly-created title of Fire Lieutenant on or about April 27, 2012.7    On 
May 3, 2012 and June 4, 2013, the Village posted memoranda, referred to as “vacancy 
notices,”8 announcing the creation of the provisional Fire Lieutenant position and DHR’s 
intent to eliminate the Administrative Fire Captain/Staff Officer position.9    
 The May 3, 2012 notice was addressed to all personnel and stated:   
The Staff Officer position will become vacant on May 28, 
2012 when Captain Mann moves to the Training Officer 
position.  Based on a comprehensive review of the 
organizational structure of this department, along with the 
operating budget and current economic climate, I’ve decided 
to eliminate the Captain/Staff Officer position and create a 
new Lieutenant/Staff Officer position.  The duties and 
schedule will remain the same - only the rank will change.  
 
The creation of a new rank of Lieutenant has been 
authorized by the Westchester County Department of 
Human Resources based on the proposed job description 
that we provided.  The job description (attached) describes 
the distinguishing features of the new class, examples of 
work, required knowledge, skills, abilities and attributes, and 
minimal acceptable training and experience.  The salary rate 
for the position of Fire Lieutenant will be 15% above First 
Grade Firefighter.  
 
I anticipate promoting one firefighter to the rank of 
Lieutenant in June 2012, and this new Lieutenant will serve 
in the Staff Officer position.  Since we do not currently have 
a Civil Service eligibility list for Lieutenant the new 
appointments will be made provisionally and will be open to 
any career member meeting the minimum requirements.  We 
will then request to participate in the next Civil Service test 
for the position of Fire Lieutenant whenever it is offered, and 
the member appointed provisionally now will receive a 
permanent appointment assuming he finishes in the top 
                                                     
7 SOF, ¶ 5. 
8 SOF, ¶ 6. 
9 SOF, ¶ 3 which contains the collective bargaining agreement.  Article XIV, §W of the 
agreement specifically refers to the position of “Administrative Captain” which is also 
called “Staff Officer.”    
Case No. CP-1352 
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three on the new eligibility list.10  
 
 The UFA filed an improper practice on or about June 14, 2012 alleging that the 
announced plans to transfer duties to the Fire Lieutenant title violated § 209-a.1(d) of 
the Act.  By decision dated February 4, 2015, the ALJ dismissed the charge as being 
premature.11 
 The Village filed the instant unit placement petition on October 15, 2012. On 
May 31, 2013, the Fire Chief rescinded his May 3, 2012 notice stating, in relevant part, 
that “[t]he Village represents that the position of Lieutenant/Staff Officer will perform the 
duties and work exclusively being performed by the bargaining unit position of 
Administrative Captain/Staff Officer if it is filled. The Village represents that it shall not fill 
the lieutenant position until a decision is reached on the Petition and improper practice 
charge.”12   
 The June 4, 2013 notice of vacancy, also addressed to all personnel, advised 
that the Fire Department anticipated filing the “vacant Staff Officer position” by 
promoting one Firefighter to the rank of Fire Lieutenant, that the DHR approved the 
position of Fire Lieutenant noting that the pay for position would be 15% above First 
Grade Firefighter, that an initial provisional appointment would be made and that 
Firefighters interested in applying for the position should submit a resume and a letter of 
interest no later than June 25, 2013.13  
 On August 14, 2012, the Village’s Board of Trustees adopted a resolution stating 
                                                     
10 SOF, ¶ 7. 
11 Village of Scarsdale, 48 PERB ¶ 4510 (2015). 
12 SOF, ¶ 13. 
13 SOF, ¶ 6. 
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that the Village’s budget for the fiscal year 2012-2013 would fund seven Captain 
positions, including one Staff Captain, one Scheduling Captain, four Fire Suppression 
Captains and one Training Captain, and that the Village Manager and the Fire Chief 
decided to eliminate the Staff Officer position and to authorize, instead, a Fire 
Lieutenant position. That resolution further stated that “[t]he duties of the Administrative 
Fire Captain/Staff Officer position have been distributed among and are being 
performed by the remaining Fire Captains in the unit.”14 
 The job specifications for Firefighter contain the following “distinguishing 
features”:  
This work is of a hazardous nature, involving responsibility 
for fire fighting and prevention, salvage and rescue 
operations and requires mental acuity and physical stamina 
in the performance of duties.  Fire fighting and fire 
prevention duties are performed under the direct supervision 
of superior officers.  Routine maintenance work and 
custodial work on the station house and equipment is 
performed under general supervision and inspected upon 
completion.  Does related work as required.15   
 
Included among the illustrative examples of Firefighter work are:    
 
Responds to fire alarms and emergency calls with a fire 
company; 
Lays and connects hose lines and nozzles, turns water on 
and off; 
Holds fire hose and directs stream; 
Erects and climbs ladders to enter burning buildings when 
necessary;  
Makes openings in burning buildings for ventilation and 
entrance; 
Removes persons from burning buildings; 
Performs salvage operations at scenes of fire, such as 
covering furniture with tarpaulins and cleaning away 
                                                     
14 SOF,¶ 9. 
15 SOF, Ex. 1 at p 20. 
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debris.16  
 
 The job specifications for Fire Captain contain the following “distinguishing 
features” of that title:  
Under general supervision, an incumbent in this class has 
responsible charge of a fire station or stations on an 
assigned shift, and directs the work of a company at fires, 
other emergencies or in the station or stations. In the 
absence of or, pending the arrival of a superior officer, a Fire 
Captain assumes responsibility for the protection of life and 
property. Supervision is exercised over a number of 
subordinate paid and volunteer personnel.  Does related 
work as required.17  
 
Included among the various examples of Fire Captain work are:    
Directs the work of firefighters assigned to a fire station or of 
a department pending the arrival of a superior officer, both in 
the quarters and at the scene of the fires and emergency;  
Directs the housekeeping of quarters and the care of 
apparatus, equipment and supplies; 
Responds to all alarms while on duty; 
Assigns firefighters to lay out and connect hose lines, turn 
water on and off, raise ladders and ventilate buildings;  
Inspects property at scene of a fire to prevent re-ignition; 
Directs the mechanical operation of apparatus and 
equipment at the scene of a fire or an emergency call; 
Supervises and assists in salvage and cleanup after 
extinguishment of a fire;  
Inspects equipment, grounds and station to insure proper 
order and condition;  
Maintains discipline and enforces rules and regulations; 
Inspects buildings and premises for fire hazards or 
supervises such inspections;  
Makes reports of personnel and activities;  
Trains and drills subordinates;  
Uses computer applications or other automated systems 
such as spreadsheets, word processing, calendar, e-mail 
and database software in performing work assignments.18  
                                                     
16 Id. 
17 SOF, Ex. 1 at p. 21. 
18 Id. 
Case No. CP-1352 
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 The specifications for the title of Fire Lieutenant contain the following 
“distinguishing features”:   
Incumbents in this class are responsible for supervising the 
activities of a group of Firefighters at the scene of fires and 
in the fire station or stations. A Lieutenant is under direct 
supervision of a superior officer; however, they have 
complete charge of operations at the scene of a fire in the 
absence of, or pending the arrival of a superior officer, and 
the Lieutenant assumes responsibility for the protection of 
life and property.  A Lieutenant also has complete charge of 
Firefighters in a fire station or stations in the absence of a 
superior officer.  Supervision is exercised over a number of 
subordinate paid and volunteer personnel.  A Lieutenant is 
also responsible for any number of administrative tasks 
related to this position.  Does related work as required.19 
 
Included among other examples of Fire Lieutenant work are:    
Supervises a crew of Fire Fighters in the housekeeping, care 
of apparatus, equipment and supplies at a fire station or 
stations;  
Assigns work to Fire Fighters directly under his command, at 
the scene of fires, in emergencies and in the station or 
stations;  
Leads crew or crews in responding to all alarms assigned 
while on duty; 
Supervises the mechanical operation of apparatus and 
equipment at the scene of a fire or an emergency call; 
Assigns personnel to lay out and connect hose lines and 
nozzles, turn water on and off, raise ladders and ventilate 
buildings; 
Inspects property at scene of fire to prevent re-ignition; 
Supervises and assists in salvage and cleanup operations 
after extinguishment of a fire; 
Supervises the cleaning, checking and replacement of tools 
and equipment on return to station;   
Inspects buildings and premises for fire hazards or 
supervises such inspections; 
Maintains discipline and enforces rules and regulations; 
Makes reports on personnel and activities; 
                                                     
19 SOF, Ex. 2. 
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Trains and drills subordinates; 
Uses computer applications and other automated systems 
such as spreadsheets, word processing, calendar, e-mail 
and database software in performing work assignments;  
Performs administrative functions and is responsible for 
administrative projects and tasks.20 
 
 DHR conducted a civil service examination for the position of Fire Lieutenant on 
June 15, 2013.  The Village has not requested a copy of the list containing the names of 
the members of the unit, if any, who passed the examination.21   
 As of the date of the stipulation of facts, no one had applied for the position of 
provisional Fire Lieutenant; the title was vacant throughout the proceedings below.22   
DISCUSSION 
 The essence of the question before us is whether, given the facts, we should 
place a newly-created yet vacant title into an existing unit.  We find that the answer to 
that question is no. 
 Based on the parties’ Stipulation of Facts, it is undisputed that the “Village posted 
vacancies for the provisional lieutenant position in May, 2012, and June 2013, but “[t]he 
Lieutenant position has not been filled,” that “[n]o one applied for the provisional 
lieutenant position as of the date of this Stipulation,” and such position “is now, and has 
always been, vacant.”23 
 It is also beyond dispute that the Village has affirmatively represented that the 
                                                     
20 Id. 
21 The Village argues that it has not filled the position pending the determination of the 
petition and in an attempt it characterizes, “to avoid an unlawful unilateral transfer of 
work.”  The Village also states that no person has applied for the position.  SOF, 11; 
Village’s Brief in Support of Exceptions, at p.16.   
22 SOF, ¶ 15. 
23 SOF, ¶¶ 6 and 15. 
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newly-created position “will perform the duties and work exclusively performed by 
[another bargaining unit position] if it is filled.”24  The parties also do not disagree on the 
wording and substance of job descriptions for the newly-created position or those of the 
other positions cited. 25   
 The Village correctly posits that the job description is evidence which could 
bolster its request that the position of Fire Lieutenant be included in the UFA’s 
bargaining unit because the position shares a “community of interest” with the unit.  But 
the inquiry into this matter must go behind and beyond the face of job descriptions and 
into the actual duties performed.  However, the factual record is void of any other 
substantive evidence of duties actually performed by any employee in that title.  The 
Board has held, as the ALJ found, that a vacant position—especially one for which no 
individual can even testify as to past duties performed, much less a position for which 
there is no current incumbent who can testify about duties currently performed—cannot 
be placed in an existing bargaining unit. 
 The Board’s reasoning on this issue is manifest, and its decision in Union-
Endicott Central School District (Union-Endicott)26 is controlling.  The Board in that 
decision was unable to find that a “community of interest” existed between the title of 
physical therapist and other titles represented by an employee organization.  The 
existence of a “community of interest” which is the sine qua non for placement in or 
creation of a unit is vociferously posited by the Village in its memorandum in support of 
its exceptions.  In Union-Endicott, as here, a position was vacant at the time of the 
                                                     
24 SOF, ¶ 11. 
25 SOF, Exs. 2 and 3. 
26 28 PERB ¶ 3029 (1995). 
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hearing before the ALJ and was vacant when the Board decided the case.  Indeed, in 
contrast to the matter here, the Board found that the employer in Union-Endicott actively 
sought to fill that position.  It did not preclude a future petition seeking placement of the 
title in a unit, but held that there was “no reasonably current evidence of the duties of 
the position which can be evaluated to determine whether the position is appropriately 
placed in the unit represented by the [employee organization].”27   
 The Board expressly found, and the Village urges on us, that a temporary 
vacancy “is not, per se, always a ground for dismissal of a petition;”28 we agree.  Here, 
however, the petition does not present a mere lapse in incumbency in a title where there 
has been some history of prior performance in that title.  Even in the case before the 
ALJ in Union-Endicott, there was not only a “job description of the previous incumbent,” 
but the testimony of a speech and language therapist who worked with the previous 
incumbent.29  The Village has only presented the written job description of a position 
with no prior history of incumbency.  As the ALJ whose findings were upheld by the 
Board in Union-Endicott found, “[a] unit placement petition for a vacant position is not 
granted as there are no duties actually being performed which can be assessed to 
determine the position’s appropriate placement.”30 
 Indeed, findings must be based on the “duties actually being performed.”  We 
cannot rely only upon a hypothetical description of work performed, but rather must 
depend on the duties actually undertaken by an individual in a specific title.  This is 
                                                     
27 Id. at 3070. 
28 28 PERB ¶ 3029, at note 3. 
29 Id. 
30 27 PERB ¶ 4077, at 4144 (emphasis added) (citation omitted). 
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consistent with the manner in which the Board reviews other placement-related issues 
such as determining whether a title is managerial or not.  For example, in Matter of 
Lippman v. Public Employment Relations Board,31 the Appellate Division upheld the 
Board’s determinations on whether certain titles should be considered managerial, 
based upon “nature of the subject employees’ duties and responsibilities,” as 
established by testimonial and documentary evidence of the actual duties performed by 
the employees in the titles at issue.32   
 That is not to say that a stipulated record without oral testimony could never form 
the basis for our finding that a position should be placed in a unit.33  However, in a case 
where there is no evidence of duties actually performed because those duties are not 
being performed and have never been performed, the ALJ properly dismissed the 
petition before her.34 
 As the Village correctly points out, the controlling description of the unit 
placement process is set forth in Weedsport Central School District:35 
A unit placement petition commences a representation 
proceeding limited to determining whether an unrepresented 
position should be accreted to a pre-existing unit based upon 
                                                     
31 263 AD2d 891 (3rd Dept 1999). 
32 263 AD2d at 897. 
33 See e.g., Weedsport Central Sch Dist, 46 PERB ¶ 4007, affd 46 PERB ¶ 3030 (2013) 
(a unit placement petition with incumbents in title was granted based on stipulated 
facts.). 
34 See City of New York v. Board of Certification of the City of New York, 2011 WL 
5240150 (S Ct NY Co 2011) (instructive case where the court upheld the Board of 
Certification’s findings on unit placement rejecting claims by the City that the Board of 
Certification “did not give enough credence to employees’ in-house titles” because the 
Board made “individual determinations as to each employee, as it should have. . . [and 
its] decision was evidence based, as is shown by its citations to individual surveys and 
specific pages of the transcript of testimony before the Board.”). 
35 46 PERB ¶ 3030, at 3066 (2013). 
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the statutory criteria in §207.1 of the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act (Act). We conduct a nonadversarial 
investigation and apply the statutory uniting criteria in 
determining a unit placement petition. The most important 
criterion under §207.1 of the Act for determining a unit 
placement petition is the community of interest standard. 
Among the factors we consider in determining whether a 
community of interest exists are similarities in terms and 
conditions of employment, shared duties and responsibilities, 
qualifications, common work location, common supervision, 
and an actual or potential conflict of interests between the 
members of the proposed unit.36 
 
The bulk of the Village’s argument on behalf of its exceptions is that the totality of the 
record before the ALJ, without testimony of the actual duties performed, establishes 
enough to place the title into a particular unit.  We reject that contention.  Shared duties, 
as those at issue in Weedsport, are presented when there are incumbents in the title 
who can offer evidence as to those duties performed.37 
 The Village takes specific exception to the ALJ’s finding that “there is no date 
certain when, if at all, the Village will fill” the position as well as to her findings that the 
Village had no efforts to fill it.  The fact remains that the position—regardless of the 
Village’s efforts to fill the vacancy—is  vacant.  The ALJ, in her decision “note[d]” that 
there was no date certain for filling the vacancy, but she did not base her decision on 
that alone.  The date of filling a vacancy is not a determinative factor in this matter 
although it places the facts in context; the fact that the position is vacant is 
determinative in the context before us.   
 As far as the Village’s concern over its exposure to an improper practice charge, 
                                                     
36 Id. (citations omitted). 
37 See, e.g., Weedsport Central School Dist, 46 PERB ¶ 4007 (2013) (the decision of 
the ALJ that the Board upheld recited the fact that there were two incumbents in the 
positions at issue). 
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our dismissal of this petition does not foreclose either party from filing a new petition for 
the position should it be filled nor both parties from agreeing on unit placement. 
 Based upon the foregoing, we deny the Village’s petition and affirm the decision 
of the ALJ. 
  IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the petition must be, and hereby is, 
dismissed in its entirety. 
DATED:  April 13, 2016 
               Albany, New York 
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 BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
 This matter comes to us on exceptions filed by the City of Rensselaer Police 
Officers Union, Inc. (Union) to a letter ruling of the Director of Conciliation (Director) 
nullifying the Union’s petition for interest arbitration and dissolving the designated 
interest arbitration panel after discovering that the petition contained proposals on 
behalf of civilian dispatchers, who are not eligible for compulsory interest arbitration. 
 We have considered the exceptions on an expedited basis. 
EXCEPTIONS 
 The Union alleges in its exceptions that the Director exceeded his authority 
and/or erred when he addressed issues concerning the Union’s petition for interest 
arbitration after the compulsory interest arbitration panel had been designated, nullified 
the Union’s petition for interest arbitration, and dissolved the designated interest 
arbitration panel. 
 The City of Rensselaer (City) filed a response to the exceptions arguing that the 
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Director did not exceed his authority by addressing issues regarding the Union’s petition 
after the interest arbitration panel had been designated.   
 Based upon our review of the record and our consideration of the parties’ 
arguments, we affirm the decision of the Director, as modified. 
FACTS 
 On or about December 8, 2015, the Union filed a petition for compulsory interest 
arbitration.  The cover letter accompanying the petition indicated a joint selection of an 
interest arbitration neutral.  On December 15, 2015, the Office of Conciliation 
designated a public interest arbitration panel including the jointly selected neutral 
member, pursuant to § 209.4 of the Public Employees’ Fair Employment Act (Act) and 
notified the panel members, the Union, and the City of the designation.1  After the panel 
had been designated, the City filed a response to the petition.   
 By letter dated February 9, 2016 to both the Union and the City, the Director 
advised that the City’s response to the Union’s petition for compulsory interest 
arbitration indicated that an improper practice charge had been filed “simultaneously.”2  
The Director’s letter thereafter advised the following, in relevant part: 
In its [improper practice] charges the City challenges 
arbitrability on procedural grounds that the union petition 
improperly includes proposals for terms and conditions of 
employment for civilian dispatchers long held to be excluded 
from compulsory interest arbitration. 
 
Statutory compulsory interest arbitration under CSL §209.4, 
is a measure of last resort.  Its application is specifically 
limited regarding eligibility, scope and duration which are 
established by statute and case law. 
The immediate issue for consideration is whether the union’s 
                                            
1 Exhibits to Union’s brief. 
2 Response to Exceptions, Ex A. 
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petition containing proposals on behalf of civilian dispatchers 
is valid in the first instance.  The requisite determination in 
this matter is the exclusive responsibility of the Director of 
Conciliation in furtherance of his processing of interest 
arbitration petitions subject to review by the Board (see 
PERB Rules of Procedure, Part 213–Exceptions to the 
Board).  In conclusion, clearly civilian dispatchers are not 
eligible for compulsory interest arbitration.  Therefore, the 
petition received on December 11, 2015 on behalf of the 
Rensselaer Police Officers Union is hereby nullified and the 
arbitration panel designated by this office on December 15, 
2015 is dissolved.  Further proceedings under CSL §209.4 
should cease until such time as a revised or otherwise 
permissible petition is filed with this office.   
 
Should there be any question about the appropriate statutory 
impasse procedure governing the terms and conditions of 
civilian dispatchers, either party may seek the appointment 
of a fact finder pursuant to CSL §209.3(b)3  
 
DISCUSSION 
 The Union first alleges in its exceptions that the Director erred and/or exceeded 
his authority by exercising jurisdiction over the Union’s petition for compulsory interest 
arbitration after the panel had been designated by nullifying the petition.  This exception 
objects to the timing of the Director’s decision, rather than the decision itself.  
Accordingly, we will first address that specific issue. 
 For the reasons that follow, we are not persuaded by the Union’s assertion that 
the mere designation of the interest arbitration panel extinguishes the Director’s 
authority and discretion to make decisions related to the processing of petitions, 
including decisions concerning eligibility of employees for compulsory interest 
arbitration.  No source for this purported limitation has been identified by the Union, and 
we decline to create such a limitation here, where the Director merely acted to correct 
                                            
3 Id. 
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an erroneous designation of a panel made in good faith reliance on the Union’s petition.   
 There is no question that we have delegated discretion to the Director in order for 
him to make necessary determinations involving the dispute resolution provisions of the 
Act and Rules, subject to our review of those determinations.4  A determination 
concerning the processing of a petition for compulsory interest arbitration is one specific 
example of such delegated discretion.  In particular, the Board has expressly reaffirmed 
its delegation, subject to review, to the Director of “determinations on jurisdictional 
questions such as whether an impasse in negotiations exists and substantive questions 
such as whether a petitioning party is entitled to interest arbitration,” as well as 
“procedural disputes regarding the striking procedure.”5   
 Although the Union repeatedly states in its brief that the Director was not 
empowered to act after the compulsory interest arbitration panel had been designated, 
its argument is unsupported by any relevant section(s) of the Act, or of our Rules of 
Procedure (Rules), nor by any case law.6  The Union has cited no relevant legal 
authority.  We held that there is no limitation regarding, specifically, when the Director 
can exercise his discretion to rectify a processing error. 
 To the extent that the Union relies upon §§ 205.7 and 205.8 of the Rules, there is 
                                            
4 Act, §§ 205.4 (a) and 205.5(k).  See also Board of Educ of the City Sch Dist of the City 
of New York, 34 PERB ¶ 3016 (2001); Patrolmen’s Benevolent Assn of the City of New 
York, Inc., 40 PERB ¶ 3010 (2007). 
5 Patrolmen’s Benevolent Assn of the City of New York, Inc., 40 PERB ¶ 3010, at 3033; 
see also County of Monroe, 39 PERB ¶ 3018 (2006) (affirming Director’s ruling that 
specific employees were ineligible for compulsory interest arbitration); Yates County, 16 
PERB ¶ 8001 (1982) (same). 
6 The Union’s reliance on Caso v Coffey, 41 NY2d 153, 9 PERB ¶ 7026 (1976), is 
misplaced, because the Director’s disputed action had nothing to do with an attempt to 
exercise power or control over an arbitration proceeding.  There is no record evidence 
or assertion by the Union that the Director issued his ruling when the arbitration was 
underway, thus interfering with the proceeding. 
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no support in the plain language of those sections for the notion that the Director may 
no longer act once the panel has been designated, or that the Director is divested of his 
discretionary authority at a particular point in the process.  Section 205.7 states that the 
board shall designate the public arbitration panel and “refer the dispute to such panel.”  
Section 205.8 states that the “conduct of the arbitration panel shall be under the 
exclusive jurisdiction and control of the arbitration panel.”  Thus, these rules simply refer 
to the exclusivity of the conduct of the panel, which relates to the panel’s role in 
resolving the dispute—not processing the petition.  The Union’s strained interpretation 
of the Rules confuses and conflates the respective roles of the Director and the 
arbitration panel.  As clarified by the Board in Town of New Windsor, Inc., the Director 
has exclusive jurisdiction relating to panel appointment; the panel has exclusive 
jurisdiction relating to the conduct of the arbitration proceeding.7   
 The panel has no part in the pre-dispute resolution processing of the petition and, 
therefore, cannot compete with the Director’s role in that area.  Since the Director’s 
disputed ruling herein made an eligibility determination and then addressed the 
propriety (or lack thereof) of the panel appointment, it was within his purview. 
 Our finding is supported by Patrolmen’s Benevolent Assn of the City of New 
York, Inc.,8 in which the Board rejected a similar attempt to read our Rules  to support a 
claim that the Director had not been delegated discretion to make a specific 
determination.  Here, as there, the Director acted within his discretion. 
 We turn next to the second question presented by the Union’s exceptions, which 
is whether the Director erred when he “nullified” the petition and dissolved the 
                                            
7 31 PERB ¶ 3061, 3033 (1998). 
8 40 PERB ¶ 3010, at 3033. 
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designated panel.  While the previously addressed exception related to the timing of the 
Director’s ruling, this exception concerns the merit and/or scope of his decision.  Since 
we have reaffirmed that the Director has Board-delegated authority to process interest 
arbitration petitions and make decisions related thereto, and have found that there is no 
constraint limiting the timeframe within which he may issue such decisions, the only 
question remaining is whether the Director abused his discretion when he issued the 
disputed letter ruling and took the actions referenced therein.  We find that he did not. 
 As the Board has previously explained, our Rules require that: 
…the Director [of Conciliation] examine the facts and 
circumstances of the dispute and apply the judgment he has 
gained through experience in such matters to those facts 
and circumstances.  In such instances, we choose to defer 
to the judgment of the Director, unless the objections of a 
party are compelling.9 
 
Thus, we must examine the objective criteria that the Director applied, as well as the 
surrounding facts and circumstances.  In so doing, we conclude that the Director did not 
abuse his discretion in taking the action that he did. 
 It is undisputed that the Union’s petition improperly included proposals on behalf 
of a group of employees, civilian dispatchers, who are not statutorily entitled to 
compulsory interest arbitration.  There is no evidence on the record before us, nor does 
the Union argue, that the interest arbitration proceedings had even been scheduled, let 
alone commenced.  On these particular facts, we conclude that the Director acted within 
a reasonable time after the petition was filed, and after discovering that the petition was 
improper, even though he had designated the panel and notified the parties.  Since the 
Director acted in a timely fashion after discovering the mistake, and before the 
                                            
9 Manhattan and Bronx Surface Transit Operating Auth, 39 PERB ¶ 3006 (2006).  
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proceedings had commenced, we find that he did not abuse his discretion. 
 As for the Director’s decision to “nullify” the petition and dissolve the panel, we 
likewise do not find that he abused his discretion.  Given the point in time at which he 
discovered the petition’s deficiency, he chose to attempt to rectify the situation by simply 
undoing his previous processing of the petition, rather than have an improper petition 
proceed to interest arbitration.  Since the Director also indicated in his ruling that the 
process would be discontinued “until such time as a revised or otherwise permissible 
petition is filed,” it is clear that the Director contemplated that the Union would simply 
correct its petition and re-file upon receipt of his ruling.  Any delay in obtaining an 
interest arbitration award occasioned by the Union’s decision to appeal the Director’s 
decision rather than simply re-filing an appropriate petition excluding positions that are 
not entitled to interest arbitration cannot be attributed to the Director.  Nor can it be said 
that the Union was materially prejudiced by the Director’s decision. 
 Furthermore, we reject the Union’s argument that the Director interfered with the 
judicial function of either the agency’s administrative law judges, or the Board.  It is well-
settled that the necessary eligibility determination is within the exclusive province of the 
Director, subject to the Board’s review.10     
 Finally, we address the Union’s assertion that the Director improperly became 
the City’s “agent and advocate”11 when he took the actions set forth in his letter ruling.  
Such assertions are serious in nature as they challenge the Director’s neutrality and 
should not, therefore, be made in the absence of manifest evidentiary support.  Here, 
                                            
10 Patrolmen’s Benevolent Assn of the City of New York, Inc., 40 PERB ¶ 3010, at 3033-
3034; see also County of Monroe, 39 PERB ¶ 3018; Yates County, 16 PERB ¶ 8001. 
11 Union’s brief, at p. 12. 
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the Union has offered no facts to support its allegation of bias.  The petition did not put 
the Director on notice that the dispatchers were civilian employees, and thus not entitled 
to compulsory interest arbitration.  Rather, he only became aware of this fact through 
the City’s related improper practice charge.12  The Director acted to cure this error, and 
to ensure that only claims properly subject to interest arbitration would be submitted to 
interest arbitration.  This falls far short of the proof required to support an allegation of 
bias and, therefore, we dismiss it without further discussion.  Although the City does not 
object to the Union’s suggestion that the Board effectively redraft the petition to 
eliminate demands relating to civilian dispatchers by dismissing such claims, we decline 
to do so, as the framing of proper proposals for interest arbitration is the duty of the 
parties, and not of the Board.  
 Accordingly, we affirm the letter ruling of the Director, without prejudice to the 
filing of a second petition, limited to those employees entitled to compulsory interest 
arbitration.    
DATED:  April 13, 2016 
               Albany, New York 
 
  
                                            
12 Notably, the Director candidly discloses the source of his knowledge, expressly 
referencing the City’s improper practice charge in his letter ruling.  Nor do we find it 
unlikely that the Director would have exposure to a charge that was filed with his own 
agency. 
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BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the Board of Education of the City 
School District of the City of New York (District) to a decision of an Administrative Law 
Judge (ALJ) finding that the District violated § 209-a.1 (d) of the Public Employees’ Fair 
Employment Act (Act).1  The ALJ found that the District impermissibly “reduced the 
number of parking permits available to unit employees and changed the procedures by 
which such permits are granted,” and refused to negotiate the reduced availability of 
parking with the Council of School Supervisors and Administrators (CSA).2   
 
                                            
1 47 PERB ¶ 4610 (2014). 
2 Id. at 4921. 
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EXCEPTIONS 
The District contends that the ALJ erred in not dismissing the case on the basis 
that the District did not cause or authorize the changes complained of, nor did it change 
working conditions affecting unit employees.3  The District further asserts that the ALJ 
erred in failing to balance the parties’ case-specific interests and instead found that the 
issuance of a parking permit is a mandatory subject of bargaining in all circumstances.4  
Next, the District argues that the ALJ exceeded her power and authority “in that the 
decision would reverse the City’s governance of its own streets,” and violated public 
policy.5  Finally, the District maintains that the ALJ’s remedial order erred to the extent 
that she did not consider the changed circumstances since the filing of the charge due 
to the collateral litigation resulting from her prior deferral of the matter to arbitration.6 
DISCUSSION 
The facts are stated in the ALJ’s decision.  We do not fully address each 
exception separately because, as explained below, the exceptions have already been 
the subject of authoritative determinations by the Board and by the courts reviewing the 
Board’s prior decision.7  To the extent that these determinations do not preclude the 
positions asserted by the District, we adhere to our prior decision and adopt that of the 
Appellate Division, Third Department, as dispositive of the arguments contained in the 
                                            
3 Exceptions Nos. 2.1-2.2. 
4 Exceptions No. 2.3.   
5 Exceptions Nos. 2.5, 2.4.   
6 Exception No. 2.6. 
7 44 PERB ¶ 3003 (2011), confd, City of New York v NYS Pub Empl Relations Bd, 47 
PERB ¶ 7007 (Sup Ct Alb Co 2011) (Zwack, J.), affd, 103 A.D.3d 145, 46 PERB ¶ 7001 
(3d Dept 2012). 
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exceptions. 
As a threshold matter, we note that the District has not excepted to the ALJ’s 
dismissal of its notice of claim defense and its defenses of res judicata and collateral 
estoppel.  Accordingly, those defenses are waived, and not properly before us.8 
Nor has the District addressed the ALJ’s decision’s reliance on the Board’s prior 
ruling in an improper practice proceeding involving the same transaction and issues, 
Board of Education of the City School District of the City of New York (BOE I).9  In that 
case, the Board found that the District had violated the Act and sustained a charge 
brought by Local 891, International Union of Operating Engineers (Local 891).  The 
District’s omission of this decision, and of the judicial decisions confirming it, is 
particularly glaring in view of the parties’ express stipulation before the ALJ that: 
The events leading to the instant CSA charge, the CSA 
grievance resulting in the . . . arbitration award and the Local 
891 charge all stem from the same determination regarding 
distribution of parking permits and the procedures for 
distribution of permits was similar for employees represented 
by CSA and Local 891.10 
   
During a subsequent conference, the parties clarified that the Stipulation 
represented their agreement that “the facts pertaining to the unit employees in that 
matter [BOE I] are applicable to this matter and that the facts pertaining to the [District’s] 
                                            
8 City University of New York, 48 PERB ¶ 3021, 3071 (2015) (citing Rules of Procedure 
§ 213.2 (b) (4); Village of Endicott, 47 PERB ¶ 3017, 3052, n. 5 (2014)); City of 
Schenectady, 46 PERB ¶ 3025, 3056, at n. 8 (2013), confd sub nom Matter of City of 
Schenectady v NYS Pub Empl Relations Bd, 47 PERB ¶ 7004 (Sup Ct Albany Co 
2014), affd, 136 AD3d 1086 (3d Dept 2016); Town of Orangetown, 40 PERB ¶ 3008 
(2007), confd sub nom Matter of Town of Orangetown v NYS Pub Empl Relations Bd, 
40 PERB ¶ 7008 (Sup Ct Albany Co 2007); Town of Walkill, 42 PERB ¶ 3006 (2009). 
9 44 PERB ¶ 3003. 
10 Stipulation of Facts ¶ 29. 
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actions in that matter are the same as in this matter.”11   
Despite this agreement, the District fails to in any way distinguish the claims 
before the ALJ and those the Board and the courts authoritatively determined in BOE I.  
Indeed, the District’s brief in support of its exceptions never mentions BOE I, but rather 
argues from a mélange of decisions, mostly from the 1970s and 1980s, that the ALJ: (1) 
should have found that the District had not effectuated any unilateral change, (2) erred 
in finding that that the parking permits at issue did not equate to a free parking space, 
and thus the ALJ should have conducted an independent weighing of the interests of 
the parties under the facts at issue; and (3) exceeded her jurisdiction and issued a 
ruling that violated public policy by infringing on the interests of the City of New York.12  
The Board and the courts have already considered each of these claims in BOE I and 
rejected them.13    
As the sole respondent before the Board in BOE I, and the only petitioner 
recognized to have a cognizable interest before the courts in the subsequent 
proceedings under Article 78 of the Civil Practice Law and Rules,14 the District clearly 
                                            
11 ALJ letter to parties, August 7, 2014.  The ALJ’s letter puts the parties on notice to 
“consider this letter as part of the record in this matter,” and urges them to contact her 
“immediately” with any questions regarding the letter memorializing the conference.  Id.  
12 Brief in Support of Exceptions at pp 8-10; 10-13; 13-16. 
13 BOE I, 44 PERB ¶ 3003, at 3031-3033 (Board decision); City of New York, 44 PERB 
¶ 7007, at 7013-7014 (Supreme Court decision); City of New York, 103 AD3d at 149-
152, 46 PERB ¶ 7001, at 7002-7005. 
14 Supreme Court found that “[t]he City of New York was not a party to the 
administrative process [before PERB] and pursuant to statute has no standing to bring 
this proceeding,” and thus dismissed the City’s petition, leaving the District as the only 
petitioner.  City of New York, 44 PERB ¶ 7007, at 7013.  The Appellate Division affirmed 
Supreme Court’s holding on that point.  City of New York, 103 AD3d at 149, 46 PERB ¶ 
7001, at 7002. 
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was a party to those matters, had a full and fair opportunity to litigate these issues, so 
that collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion, bars the District from contesting the 
material facts and legal issues necessarily decided adverse to it in those proceedings.15  
Moreover, even if we were to find that collateral estoppel did not apply to the 
facts and legal issues actually determined by our decision and those of the courts in 
BOE I, those cases are governing precedent which the District never even attempted to 
address or distinguish.  Rather, the District has treated this matter as if there were no 
binding precedent construing the Act and expressly governing the issues here, instead 
arguing solely from general principles.  Accordingly, we find that the District has 
proffered no reason for us to vary from our decision in BOE I, especially in light of the 
Appellate Division’s binding and authoritative findings as to the identical claims raised 
by the District in objecting to that decision, which we adopt.  In its decision, the 
Appellate Division rejected the claims pursued in the exceptions, and we reject them for 
the reasons stated by the Court in its opinion.16   
 Accordingly, we affirm the decision and order of the ALJ.  
 IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED the District will forthwith: 
 
1. Make available to CSA unit employees free parking, upon request, on a first come, 
first served basis, as was available before the fall of 2008; 
 
                                            
15 Collateral estoppel applies where “(1) the issue sought to be precluded is identical to 
a material issue necessarily decided by the administrative agency in a prior proceeding; 
and (2) there was a full and fair opportunity to contest this issue in the administrative 
tribunal.”  Jeffreys v Griffin, 1 N.Y.3d 34, 39 (2003); Kaufman v Eli Lilly & Co., 65 NY2d 
449, 455-456 (finding collateral estoppel applicable to subsequent suit against tortfeasor 
brought by unrelated plaintiff); Vega v Metro Trans Auth, 133 AD3d 518, 519 (1st Dept 
2015) (following Kaufman). 
16 107 AD3d at 149-152, 46 PERB ¶ 7001, at 7003-7005.   
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2. Make whole, with interest at the statutory judgment rate, CSA bargaining unit 
members who, upon a showing of reasonable documentary evidence and/or 
affidavits, incurred parking expenses that they would not have incurred but for the 
elimination of the availability of free parking on a first served basis from September 
2008 until the free parking benefit provided by paragraph 1 is restored;  
 
3. Negotiate, upon the CSA’s demand, with the CSA regarding the availability of free 
parking for members of the CSA bargaining unit; and 
 
4. Sign and post the notice prescribed by the ALJ in her decision at all physical and 
electronic locations customarily used to post notices to unit employees. 
 
DATED:  April 13, 2016 
               Albany, New York 
 
 
 
   
NOTICE TO ALL 
EMPLOYEES 
PURSUANT TO 
THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE 
 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
 
and in order to effectuate the policies of the 
 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' FAIR EMPLOYMENT ACT 
 
we hereby notify all employees of the Board of Education of the City School District of the City of New 
York (District) in the unit represented by the Council of School Supervisors and Administrators (CSA) 
that the District will forthwith:   
 
1. Make available to CSA unit employees free parking, upon request, on a first 
come, first served basis, as was available before the fall of 2008; 
 
2. Make whole CSA bargaining unit members who, upon a showing of 
reasonable documentary evidence and/or affidavits, incurred parking 
expenses that they would not have incurred but for the elimination of the 
availability of free parking on a first served basis from the fall of 2008 until the 
free parking benefit provided by paragraph 1 is restored; and 
 
3. Negotiate, upon the CSA’s demand, with the CSA regarding the availability of 
free parking for members of the CSA bargaining unit. 
  
 
 
Dated . . . . . . . . . .  By  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   
on behalf of the Board of Education of the City   School 
District of the City of New York  
   
 
This Notice must remain posted for 30 consecutive days from the date of posting, and 
must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material.  
  
 
  STATE OF NEW YORK 
 PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
____________________________________________ 
 
In the Matter of    
 
UNITED FEDERATION OF TEACHERS, LOCAL 2, 
AMERICAN FEDERATION OF TEACHERS, AFL-CIO,  
 
Charging Party, 
CASE NO. U-29510 
 
- and - 
 
BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE CITY SCHOOL 
DISTRICT OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, 
 
Respondent. 
____________________________________________ 
 
RICHARD E. CASAGRANDE, GENERAL COUNSEL (STEVEN A. FRIEDMAN 
of counsel), for Charging Party 
 
DAVID BRODSKY, DIRECTOR OF LABOR RELATIONS AND COLLECTIVE 
BARGAINING (KAREN SOLIMANDO of counsel), for Respondent 
 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
 This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the United Federation of Teachers, 
Local 2, AFL-CIO (UFT) to a letter decision (Decision) of the Director of Public 
Employment Practices and Representation (Director) declining the UFT’s application to 
reopen the improper practice charge which had been withdrawn pursuant to a 
stipulation of settlement (Stipulation).1  The UFT asserts that the Board of Education of 
the City School District of the City of New York (District) failed to comply with a material 
condition for the withdrawal of the charge, and that the Stipulation’s provision that, 
under such circumstances, an application to reopen the charge would not be opposed  
                                            
1 Exceptions, Exhibits A (Decision) and C (Stipulation).   
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by the District should be given effect.   Because we find that the District in fact did fail to 
perform the narrow and concrete material conditions in return for which the UFT agreed 
to withdraw the charge, we hereby reopen the charge and remand to the Director for 
further proceedings consistent with this decision and order. 
EXCEPTIONS 
The UFT excepts to the Director’s finding that the UFT did not establish that the 
District “failed to comply with narrow and concrete conditions of a material nature, which 
were the sole consideration for withdrawal of the [charge],” pursuant to the Stipulation.2 
FACTS 
The original charge in this matter alleged that the District violated §§ 209-a.1 (a) 
and (d) by failing to provide information regarding, among other items, pre-qualification 
solicitations issued by the District inviting proposals from any potential vendors “for the 
provision of any services that are, or have been in part provided by UFT-represented 
employees.”3   
By January 6, 2015, the parties had agreed upon, and both parties executed,4 
the Stipulation, which provides, in pertinent part, as follows: 
1. The [District] represents that it will provide the UFT with access 
to a [District] website that provides vendors’ descriptions of the type 
of services offered by the vendors, and which are responsive to the 
information requests contained in the Charge, no later than 30 
calendar days after the execution of this agreement.  The parties 
                                            
2 Exceptions ¶ 2. 
3 Exceptions, Exhibit B, ¶ 9 (b).  The information request additionally sought information 
regarding a specific pre-qualification solicitation at issue in a separate then-pending 
charge, and any responses thereto, provided specific examples of such solicitations of 
which the UFT was aware, and sought information regarding responses to any 
responsive solicitations.  Id. ¶ 9 (a)-(c). 
4 The UFT executed the Stipulation on December 23, 2014; the District on January 6, 
2015.  (Stipulation at 2).   
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agree that if this obligation is not satisfied, the UFT may reopen the 
Charge and the [District] will not oppose. 
 
2. The [District] represents that the documents provided to the UFT 
(both in hard copy as well as via electronic access and those that the 
UFT will have access to electronically pursuant to paragraph 1 
above) are the only documents that are available in the [District’s] 
regular business records that are provided by each vendor and 
describe the services provided by each vendor and which are 
responsive to the Charge.  This representation does not include 
documents that are created at the school-level. 
 
3. The UFT agrees to withdraw, with prejudice, [the charge] subject 
to the provisions of paragraph 1 above.5 
 
At 2:48 p.m. on October 1, 2014, Karen Solimando, the District’s Deputy Director 
for Labor Relations, emailed two links to Steven Friedman, counsel for the UFT in this 
matter.6   At 3:05 p.m., Solimando sent an additional email, which stated: 
Originally, the DOE offered limited access to the MTAC system for 
the purpose of viewing the vendor description; however, this 
information is available in another format (i.e., the [District’s] website) 
and therefore limited access is not necessary and no longer part of 
the [District’s] offer.  I will investigate why the link is not working for 
you[;] however in the meantime attached is a sample of what is 
available.7 
 
On October 8, 2014, Solimando forwarded to Friedman via email a copy of a 
proposed draft of a stipulation of settlement.  The cover email stated that:  
Regarding the website with the description of vendor services, at the 
moment this site cannot be accessed externally [;] however, I can 
arrange for you to view/print all of the documents on this website in 
my offices at your convenience.  I am also in the process of 
                                            
5 Exceptions, Exhibit C, at ¶¶ 1-2.  The remaining portions of the Stipulation provide that 
the agreement shall not constitute a precedent for other disputes, and that the UFT 
waives all other claims arising out of this matter, other than the underlying charge for 
which the UFT sought the information, and “with regard to the information provided 
pursuant to paragraphs 1 and 2 of the” Stipulation.  Id. at ¶ 2.  
6 Exceptions, Exhibit F, attachment.  
7 Id. 
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determining when external access will be available.8 
 
 On January 6, Solimando informed Friedman in an email that she had signed the 
Stipulation, and inquired if Friedman was “available Friday at 3 or 4 to view the [District] 
website per the stipulation.”9  Solimando followed up with additional requests on 
January 8 and 9 to set up a meeting.10  On January 20, 2015, Solimando forwarded a 
copy to Friedman of the October 8, 2014 email sent at 5:22 pm, adding to it: “Please 
see below.  Let me know if you would like to set up a date/time to view/print documents 
from the [District] website.”11   
 The next day, Friedman responded, asking Solimando “Is there any way we can 
arrange for remote access so that someone from the UFT can look at the vendor 
descriptions?  You did send me some links a while ago but we were unable to open 
them.  Thanks.”12  Solimando replied “No—the site is not available [except] on a 
[District] computer.  Please let me know if you and someone from the UFT are available 
to meet in my office tomorrow.”13  On January 28, 2015, Solimando wrote to Friedman, 
stating “I have made many requests to set up a time for review in my office,” and asking 
him to select from one of several proposed dates.14 
On February 23, 2015, the UFT requested that the charge be reopened, invoking 
the language in the Stipulation that the District would not oppose such a motion.15  
                                            
8 Respondent’s Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Charging Party’s Exceptions 
(Opp Memo), Exhibit C. 
9 Opp Memo, Exhibit D, at 9. 
10 Id. 
11 Id at 8. 
12 Id at 6. 
13 Opp Memo, Exhibit D, at 6. 
14 Id. 
15 Exceptions, Exhibit D. 
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DISCUSSION 
The Board has long held that “this Board has authority to permit rescission of the 
withdrawal of an improper practice charge,” although “such discretion should be 
exercised only in extremely rare and limited circumstances.”16  The Board explained 
that “a mere difference between the parties in interpretation of a settlement agreement 
or a difference of opinion concerning the extent to which compliance has been achieved 
is insufficient to warrant the reopening of a settled improper practice charge.”17  Rather, 
“only under circumstances in which there is no colorable claim of compliance with the 
settlement agreement or in which it can be shown that the noncomplying party has 
otherwise repudiated the agreement that a charge will be reopened.”18  
In explicating this standard, the Board relied on and applied its prior decision in 
Public Employees’ Federation (Farkas).19  In Farkas, the Board exercised jurisdiction to 
reopen a settlement agreement where the conditions for the withdrawal of a charge 
“were sufficiently narrow and concrete for the question [of violation of such conditions] 
                                            
16 State of New York (SUNY Potsdam), 22 PERB ¶ 3045, 3103 (1989). 
17 Id. 
18 Id.  We are not persuaded by that portion of State of New York (SUNY Potsdam) that 
analogizes the burden of proving a breach of a stipulation of withdrawal with the burden 
of proving the repudiation of a private agreement. That analysis presumes that 
conditional withdrawal of improper practice charges fall within the proscription of § 205.5 
(d) of the Act that “[t]he board shall not have authority to enforce an agreement between 
an employer and an employee organization.”  Reading this language to preclude our 
reopening improper practice charges upon an appropriate showing is not compelled by 
the Act, as § 205.5 (d) also expressly confers upon the Board “exclusive non-delegable 
jurisdiction” over improper practices.  Moreover, such a reading of the Act not only 
artificially narrows the Board’s jurisdiction, but also creates a perverse incentive for 
parties to willfully flout the stipulated conditions for the withdrawal, as no other recourse 
would exist.  Although the Director properly honored this reasoning, we decline to follow 
it.  
19 15 PERB ¶ 3020, 3033 (1982). 
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to be readily susceptible to answer.”20  The Board found that “[w]here a charge is 
withdrawn upon a written understanding that such narrow and concrete conditions be 
met by a respondent and the conditions are of a material nature, the failure of the 
respondent to perform those acts may nullify the withdrawal of the charge.”21  These 
decisions have not been found inconsistent as evidenced by the Board’s continued 
reliance on Farkas as setting forth one prong of the applicable standard.22   
Here, the District undertook two obligations in the Stipulation, to “provide the UFT 
with access to a [District] website that provides” the requested information within 30 
days of the execution of the Stipulation, and, in the event that “this obligation is not 
satisfied,” to not oppose a motion by the UFT to reopen.  Because the record 
establishes that the District willfully did not comply with either of the two conditions in 
the Stipulation for withdrawal without any colorable claim of right we find that the UFT 
has met its burden to justify reopening of the withdrawn charge. 
Where the Board has been required to interpret an agreement as part of deciding 
a charge, it has held that 
we apply standard principles of contract interpretation focused on 
discerning the parties’ intent by giving a practical interpretation to the 
language utilized. If the contract language is reasonably clear but 
susceptible to more than one interpretation, we will consider parol 
evidence in the record to determine the parties' intent.23  
 
                                            
20 Id. 
21 Id. 
22 See, e.g., PEF (Stewart), 45 PERB ¶ 3005, 3009 & n. 6 (2012); UFT (Fearon), 33 
PERB ¶ 3003, 3010, & n. 6 (2000).  
23 Town of Fishkill, 44 PERB ¶ 3013, 3049 (2011), citing County of Columbia, 41 PERB 
¶ 3023 (2008); see generally Monroe Co. v NYS Pub Empl Relations Bd, 263 AD3d 
885, 1441, 44 PERB ¶ 7006 (3d Dept 2011) (deferring to and upholding Board’s 
contractual interpretation and exclusion of parol evidence where contractual terms were 
unambiguous). 
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The Stipulation provides that the District will provide access to a “District 
website,” and subsequently describes the documents to be provided as “those that the 
UFT will have access to electronically pursuant to paragraph 1.”  The plain meaning of 
these provisions supports the contention that the parties’ understood that the District 
would supply access via a District-operated website that could be accessed by the UFT 
electronically.  Nothing in the language supports the District’s contention that the 
Stipulation required it only to provide access by an intranet that required the physical 
presence of a UFT representative at the District’s offices, thereby limiting access to the 
business hours and convenience of the District.24   
Moreover, even treating the language of the Stipulation as susceptible to the 
interpretation urged by the District, the parol evidence of the parties’ correspondence 
prior to the execution of the Stipulation negates such a reading.  Solimando initially 
emailed Friedman two links, which ostensibly could be used by the UFT from their own 
offices, and subsequently emailed him that “I will investigate why the link is not working 
for you.”25   A week later, Solimando emailed Friedman stating that “[r]egarding the 
website with the description of vendor services, at the moment this site cannot be 
accessed externally,” and offered access at her office.26  Solimando’s email then states 
                                            
24 The District’s contention in opposing the exceptions that “[t]he Union . . . failed to offer 
any exception whatsoever as to why reviewing this information on a [District] 
computer—which is exactly what the Settlement Agreement states—was unacceptable” 
is nowhere supported by the text of the Stipulation, and no citation is provided.  Opp 
Memo at 1 (emphasis added).  The only use of such language in the parties’ 
correspondence or elsewhere in the record is in Solimando’s January 22, 2015 email.  
(Opp Memo Exhibit D, at 6).  This email, sent almost exactly a month after the UFT 
executed the Stipulation, does not reflect the course of negotiations between the parties 
as shown by the emails prior to execution.    
25 Exceptions, Exhibit F. 
26 Opp Memo, Exhibit C (emphasis added).   
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“I am also in the process of determining when external access will be available.”27  In 
context, the offer of access at the District’s office was a makeshift expedient offered on 
an interim basis.28   
Thus, the pre-execution correspondence unequivocally supports the UFT’s 
contention that the parties’ expressed intent was that the website would be accessible 
externally.  Indeed, we find that, between the language of the Stipulation, and 
Solimando’s provision of links for external use, and her repeated assurances that she 
was endeavoring to resolve the problem with external use, the evidence establishes that 
“there is no colorable claim of compliance with the settlement agreement.”29   
Despite this, the District did not comply with its other obligation under the 
Stipulation, that it would not oppose a motion to reopen in the event it did not timely 
comply with its obligation to provide electronic access.  Whether characterized as a 
readily ascertainable material failure of the condition for the charge’s withdrawal (as in 
Farkas) or as a breach, absent any colorable claim of right, of the Stipulation (as in 
State of New York (SUNY Potsdam)), the District has acted to deprive the UFT from 
receiving the fruits of its bargain while retaining the benefit of the withdrawal.  
Accordingly, the Director’s Decision is reversed, and the charge must be reopened. 
 IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the charge must be, and hereby is, 
                                            
27 Id. 
28 We note that the District, in quoting the October 8, 2014 email, to demonstrate that 
remote access “is not possible” leaves out the immediately preceding critical phrase “at 
this moment.” (Opp Memo at 6).  Nor does the District address Solimando’s immediately 
following statement in the email that she was “determining when external access will be 
available.”  Opp Memo, Exhibit C. The argument, more ingenious than ingenuous, is 
belied by the very document it relies upon.  The paucity of the District’s argument is 
underscored by its selective and misleading quoting of the correspondence.  
29 State of New York (SUNY Potsdam), 22 PERB ¶ 3045, at 3103. 
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reopened, and the matter remanded to the Director for further proceedings consistent 
with this decision. 
DATED:  April 13, 2016 
               Albany, New York 
       
 
  
  STATE OF NEW YORK 
 PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
_________________________________________ 
 
In the Matter of 
 
AMSTERDAM TEACHERS ASSOCIATION, NYSUT, 
AFT, AFL-CIO, 
  
Charging Party, 
CASE NO. U-31433 
- and - 
 
GREATER AMSTERDAM CITY SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
 
Respondent. 
_________________________________________ 
 
DEREK J. LEWIS, for Charging Party 
  
 BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
  This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the Amsterdam Teachers 
Association, NYSUT, AFT, AFL-CIO (ATA) to a decision of an Administrative Law Judge 
(ALJ) dismissing its charge that the Greater Amsterdam City School District (District) 
violated § 209-a.1 (d) of the Public Employees’ Fair Employment Act (Act) when it 
assigned and permitted nonunit employees to perform tasks related to student 
attendance.1  For the reasons stated herein, we affirm that decision and order. 
EXCEPTIONS 
 The ATA filed nine exceptions to the ALJ’s determination, seven of which  
collectively object to the ALJ’s reliance on the testimony of each of the District’s 
witnesses,2 and two of which except to the factual and legal conclusions drawn by the 
                                                     
1 48 PERB ¶ 4522 (2015). 
2 Those witnesses were Michele Downing, Eric McClary, Thomas Perillo, Charles 
Myers, Donna Decker, Rick Potter and Christin Pietro. Exceptions, “second” through 
“eighth.” 
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ALJ from that testimony.3 
FACTS 
 The ALJ conducted three days of hearings during which both parties called 
witnesses and after which both filed post-hearing briefs.  Peter Greco, the teacher at 
issue who was laid off and the individual who the ATA alleges exclusively performed the 
tasks that are now performed by nonunit employees, was employed by the District in the 
title of Attendance Teacher from September, 2003 until the District laid him off in June, 
2011.4  Kenneth Engle, who was the attendance teacher before Greco, testified that the 
position was first created in 1989 and through Greco’s departure5 he and Greco were 
the only two to hold that title.  Therefore, the relevant facts and testimony before us are 
only those related to tasks and duties performed before Greco’s departure.6   
 The parties atomized the duties of an attendance teacher into a number of 
constituent tasks.  The ALJ heard testimony and received evidence set against a 
framework based on a written job description containing those particular 20 tasks.  
There was disagreement as to whether the first sixteen of those tasks were the only 
relevant tasks (as they were the only ones included in the job description promulgated 
by the District during Greco’s tenure) or whether the other additional four tasks listed 
were also at issue.  The ALJ took testimony on all 20 tasks and for purposes of our 
factual discussion, we rely on the list of 20 tasks before the ALJ, although not all tasks 
                                                     
3 Exceptions, “first” and “ninth”. 
4 The State Education Department permanently certified him as a “School Attendance 
Teacher” in 2004.  Tr, at p. 181. 
5 Charging Party Ex. 2. 
6 The District moved before the ALJ to dismiss the instant claim as being untimely.  The 
ALJ denied the motion, and the District did not take exception to that finding.  Therefore, 
the question of whether the charge is time-barred is not before us.  See, eg, Local 158, 
IUOE (Jones), 48 PERB ¶ 3019 (2015), citing City of Lockport, 47 PERB ¶3030, 3093, 
at n. 8 (2014), quoting Village of Endicott, 47 PERB ¶3017, at 3052, at n. 5 (2014) 
(citing § 213.2 (b) (4) PERB Rules of Procedure). 
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bear upon our decision.7   
 Below, we discuss the tasks ostensibly assigned to Greco and the evidence 
marshalled as to who performed those tasks.8  With respect to task numbers 39, 810, 
911, 1112, 1213, 1314 1415, 1516 and 1917, either Greco admitted he did not exclusively 
perform such functions or those functions were eliminated or not yet sufficiently 
implemented during his tenure so that we do not consider them in the context of this 
                                                     
7 See 48 PERB ¶ 4522, at n. 9. 
8 The testimony we consider is related exclusively to tasks performed before the District 
laid off Greco.  We are not considering testimony concerning practices after such 
period, or testimony for which a time frame cannot reasonably be ascertained, unless 
such testimony relates to work that was performed by a unit member but is no longer 
being performed by a unit member. 
9 (3) Participating in the District’s student referral system regarding attendance.  (Perillo 
testified that he was actively involved in the student referral system as a building 
principal and as superintendent, and Greco acknowledged that teachers and nonunit 
administrators participated in this process and such meetings); Tr, at pp. 63, 67, 274-
276. 
10 (8) Assisting in the processing of annual health and welfare reports (eliminated); Tr, at 
p. 175-176. 
11 (9) Conducting a biennial citywide census of all children ages birth to 21 and 
preparing all local and state-required reports (eliminated); Tr, at pp. 39, 205. 
12 (11) Compiling birth rate data from appropriate sources to aid in the development of 
annual planning documents (eliminated); Tr, at pp. 93, 287. 
13 (12) Preparing reports for the Director of Pupil Services and building Principals 
regarding kindergarten registration (Greco testified that he did not actually prepare 
reports and that other nonunit personnel did follow-up visits, although he was the only 
individual to make home visits); Tr, at p. 98, 288. 
14 (13) Preparing and distributing the 40-week attendance card to all public school 
buildings and responsibility for all monthly enrollment reports; Tr, at pp. 205, 253 
(although Greco testified he prepared these cards (TR, at p. 30-32), the testimony of 
current school personnel that those cards are no longer being used is uncontradicted.  
Given their knowledge of current practices, they are more credible on this issue.) 
15 (14) Preparing the monthly average daily attendance report and filing the SA 129, 
along with related reports, with the Director of Finance (Greco testified he did not 
prepare them); Tr, at p. 102. 
16 (15) Coordinating all activities surrounding PL 874, including the preparation of 
reports (Greco not familiar with this task); Tr, at pp. 34, 39, 104. 
17 (19) Assisting and maintaining all records and letters pertaining to the Attendance 
Truancy Program established during the 2009-2010 school year (not implemented until 
the 2009-2010 year so that there could not have been any true past practice of 
exclusivity in the performance of such duties); Charging Party Ex. 3.  
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charge.   
 There were contested questions of fact with respect to the remaining 11 tasks:18 
 (1) Investigating and reporting on the absences of students who are 
referred or known to the District as truants.  Greco testified that he alone was 
responsible for investigating truants and absences.  But he also testified that “[a]ny 
teacher could” confer with students and parents on these issues as could building 
principals.19  The District contended that because members of a bargaining unit 
represented by the Civil Service Employees Association performed support functions, 
such as generating attendance numbers and related material, that Greco had no 
exclusive role in this process.20  
 Perillo, the District’s superintendent, testified that when he was a building 
principal for the elementary school and later for the middle school as well as 
superintendent,21 before Greco’s appointment as attendance teacher when Engle was 
attendance teacher and after his appointment (and Perillo was not a member of the 
bargaining unit), he was actively involved in investigating and reporting student 
absences.22 
 (2) Conferring with students and parents regarding poor school attendance 
and making referrals to the Department of Probation where necessary or 
appropriate. Greco testified that he exclusively met with students and parents and 
made home visits regarding student absences.23  He also testified that other, nonunit 
                                                     
18 We have kept the numbering of each task as they appear on Charging Party Ex. 3 
which is more inclusive than Resp. Ex. 1. 
19 Tr, at p. 52. 
20 Tr, at p. 49. 
21 Tr, at pp. 266-267. 
22 Tr, at p. 268. 
23 Tr, at pp. 12-13, 19, 76. 
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members such principals and assistant principals, could meet with parents and students 
regarding attendance.24  Perillo testified that as a building principal, he made home 
visits and conferred by letter with students and parents.  He would refer matters to 
Greco but would also undertake these activities, at times, independent of and without 
contacting Greco.25 
 In addition, Myers testified that during Greco’s tenure, Potter, who was the 
alternative education principal, also conducted home visits regarding attendance 
issues.26 
 (4) Representing the District at hearings in Family Court, along with the 
school attorney, regarding truancy and related problems.  This task involves the 
New York State’s Person In Need of Supervision (PINS) program which the family court 
administers.  Greco testified that he was the only individual tasked with meeting with 
students and parents on attendance issues that could form the basis for a PINS petition.  
He also testified that he alone was responsible for preparing the attendant paper work 
for those petitions.27   
 Perillo testified that he, too, was called as a witness and represented the District 
in PINS matters in family court in his capacity as building principal.28  He did not testify 
about the completion of the paperwork associated with such a proceeding.  Downing 
testified that other nonunit administrators went to family court and participated in PINS 
                                                     
24 Tr., at p. 52. 
25 Tr, at pp. 270, 300. 
26 Tr, at pp. 349-350. 
27 Tr, at pp. 20-21, 24, 57.  Greco also testified that that there were between 300 and 
400 such petitions filed while he was employed by the District.  (Tr, at p. 53).  This was 
contested by the District where a number of eight such proceedings was proffered by 
the District as being more realistic.  (Tr, at p. 172-173).  The resolution of the true 
number is irrelevant to our discussion. 
28 Tr, at p. 276. 
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proceedings but she offered no time frame as to when those tasks were performed by 
such nonunion administrators.29   
 (5) Establishing and maintaining a liaison relationship with local agencies 
regarding issues germane to school attendance.   Greco testified that he routinely 
met with a variety of local government social welfare agencies and the county’s 
probation department and that he was their source for information and the one 
responsible for responding to subpoenas for information.30 
 Perillo, on the other hand, testified that he was actively involved with and acted 
as a liaison to outside local government agencies including the district attorney’s office 
(although there was a dispute as to whether such liaison with the district attorney 
occurred after Greco’s termination) with respect to attendance issues.31   
 (6) Keeping current on all New York State and Federal regulations 
governing school attendance and advising the Director of Pupil Services on such 
regulations. Greco testified that he was the only individual employed by the District 
who attended “attendance themed conferences . . . to keep current in such matters.”32 
Perillo contradicted this assertion in full and categorically testified that he and many 
others in administration kept current on regulations and law as they had to and attended 
conferences.33 
 (7) Coordinating all activities in the District related to child labor laws and 
the issuance of working papers. Greco proffered that he was the sole employee 
responsible for coordinating the issuance of working papers, although he worked with 
                                                     
29 See Tr, at pp. 198-199. 
30 Tr, at p. 24. 
31 Tr, at pp. 277-279, 284. 
32 Memorandum in Support of Exceptions, at p. 4; Tr, at pp. 78-79. 
33 Tr, at pp. 284-285. 
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support staff to carry out that task.34  In contradiction, Perillo testified that Greco was not 
the only person involved with coordinating this function; when students came by his 
office as middle school principal, he “or one of the other administrators or secretaries 
brought the student and their parents down to the Guidance Office and hooked them up 
with the Guidance secretary, and the secretary is the one who walked them through and 
gave their papers.”35   
 (10) Coordinating the immigration/naturalization program regarding school 
attendance for students living in the District with temporary visas. Greco claimed 
that he was the only District employee assigned to check students who were residing in 
the United States on a temporary visa.36  Specifically, he testified that he visited the 
stated residences of such students to confirm they were living within the District.  
However, he failed to offer evidence as to any activity or “coordination” with the federal 
Immigration and Naturalization Service.37  Perillo testified generally that he and other 
nonunit administrators were involved with the general function of establishing the 
residency of students on temporary visas.38 
 (16) Performing other activities properly within the scope of the position or 
as requested by the Director of Pupil Services. Greco’s testimony on this general, 
catchall task, was that he essentially performed “any duties” related to attendance under 
the supervision of the Director of Pupil Services including home visits and representing 
the District in court.39  However, Myers, who was assistant principal during Greco’s 
tenure, testified that individuals other than Greco raised attendance issues at various 
                                                     
34 Tr, at pp. 39-40, 84-88. 
35 Tr, at pp. 285-286. 
36 Tr, at p. 91. 
37 Tr, at p. 92. 
38 Tr, at pp. 286-287. 
39 Tr, at pp 34-35. 
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meetings to Myers.  In addition, Myers initiated calls without Greco’s input regarding 
attendance concerns.40 
 Tasks numbered 17 through 20 do not appear on the job description formally 
promulgated by the District during Greco’s tenure.  However, there was extensive 
testimony that these were tasks associated with school attendance, and the ATA 
alleges they were exclusively performed by Greco.  Therefore, we will examine them as 
the ALJ also considered them below. 
 (17) Delivering all out of school suspension (OSS) letters to student 
residences, within 24 hours of suspension, when directed by a school 
administrator. Greco testified that the District Superintendent’s secretary would 
coordinate the delivery of OSS letters, but he exclusively delivered those letters to 
student residences during his tenure.41  Perillo categorically testified that he, as an 
elementary school and middle school principal during Greco’s tenure, delivered OSS 
letters.42 
 (18) Delivering all superintendent hearing letters to appropriate residences 
as directed by the Superintendent’s office. As with (17) above, Greco maintains that 
he exclusively delivered the superintendent’s letters,43 which Perillo disputed and 
testified that he, too, personally delivered such letters.44 
 (20) Representing the District in all matters involving Child Protective 
Services (CPS) regarding attendance issues within the District. Greco testified that 
only he filed educational neglect charges against parents which were registered with 
                                                     
40 Tr, at pp. 346-347. 
41 Tr, at p.106-108. 
42 Tr, at pp. 291-292, 293-294. 
43 Tr, at p. 36. 
44 Tr, at pp. 291-294. 
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CPS.45  Perillo testified that as a principal during Greco’s tenure, he was involved in 
representing the District in CPS matters and that Greco was not the only person 
providing such services.46   Although the time frame is not as clear, Rick Potter, an 
alternative education principal/dean of students during Mr. Greco’s tenure also testified 
that he would make calls, as needed, to CPS to report educational neglect arising out of 
poor student attendance.47 
DISCUSSION 
 The standard for analyzing whether the transfer of unit work should be subject to 
negotiations could not be more established:  
there are two essential questions that must be determined 
when deciding whether the transfer of unit work violates 
§209-a.1 (d) of the Act: a) was the work at-issue exclusively 
performed by unit employees for a sufficient period of time to 
have become binding; and b) was the work assigned to non-
unit personnel substantially similar to the exclusive unit work. 
If both these questions are answered in the affirmative, we 
will find a violation of §209-a.1 (d) of the Act unless there is a 
significant change in job qualifications. Where there is a 
significant change in job qualifications we must balance the 
respective interests of the public employer and the unit 
employees to determine whether § 209-a.1 (d) of the Act has 
been violated.48 
 
The factors we consider when determining if there is a “discernible boundary” around 
unit work to establish exclusivity include: 
the nature and frequency of the work performed by unit 
members, the geographic location where the work is 
performed, the employer's rationale for the practice, an 
explicit or implicit recognition that the at-issue work is 
                                                     
45 Tr, at pp. 38-39, 112-116. 
46 Tr, at p. 294. 
47 Tr, at p. 402. 
48 Town of Riverhead, 42 PERB ¶ 3032, 3022 (2009); Niagara Frontier Transportation 
Authority, 18 PERB ¶ 3083 (1985) and its progeny including one of our most recent 
decisions, State of New York (Division of State Police), 48 PERB ¶ 3012 (2015) have 
conclusively established this as the appropriate standard. 
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distinct, and other facts that have set the claimed unit work 
apart from work performed by non-unit personnel.49 
 
 Thus, the issue presented to us is whether the ALJ erred in finding that the at-
issue work was not exclusively performed by unit employees. It is undisputed that the 
work in question was performed by Greco but is now being performed by nonunit 
members.  Thus, if the charging party fails to satisfy the first prong of this test, we need 
not make further inquiry. 
 Some further legal context is warranted.  As we found in Manhasset Union Free 
School District, “incidental use of nonunit personnel to perform tasks is insufficient to 
defeat exclusivity.”50  Thus, we reject the contention posited by the District below that 
the mere fact that clerical and other support staff aided Greco in performing his duties, 
such as providing him with statistics or data with respect to task (1), or aided him in 
filling out forms would, in and of itself, lessen the exclusivity of work performed.  We 
also reject that, in and of itself, the participation of other nonunit members in joint 
decision making committees and similar bodies along with layers of review and 
approvals by outside entities, necessarily deprives work of its exclusive, unit 
character.51  Each of these, taken alone, will not necessarily undermine a claim of 
exclusivity.  Moreover, the transfer of incidental tasks from unit to nonunit members, 
taken with other factors, may contribute to a finding that exclusive work has been 
moved.52    
                                                     
49 Manhasset Union Free Sch Dist, 41 PERB ¶3005, 3021-22 (2008), confirmed and 
mod in part, sub nom. Manhasset USFD v NYS Pub Empl Relations Bd, 61 AD3d 1231, 
42 PERB ¶ 7004 (3d Dept 2009), on remittur, 42 PERB ¶ 3016 (2009).  We rely 
explicitly on the Board’s discussion, at length in that decision, on the concept of 
“discernible boundaries.” 
50 41 PERB ¶ 3005, at 3024. 
51 Seaford Union Free Sch Dist, 47 PERB ¶ 3034, 3106 (2014). 
52 Id. 
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 However, we are not presented with a record, as whole, that would warrant 
reversing the ultimate determination made by the ALJ.  The record supports the ALJ’s 
findings with respect to tasks described above over which there is no true factual 
dispute.  We find that those particular tasks—numbers 3, 8, 9, 11 , 12 , 13  14 , 15  and 
19—were not exclusively performed by Greco nor could they be based on the evidence 
submitted.   
 The main thrust of the exceptions is the ALJ’s reliance on and crediting of the 
testimony of the District’s witnesses. In this matter, as in all others where the ALJ’s 
findings are based on conflicting testimony, “[c]redibility determinations by an ALJ are 
generally entitled to “great weight unless there is objective evidence in the record 
compelling a conclusion that the credibility finding is manifestly incorrect.”53   
 Some of the evidence is not clearly apposite, as possibly not relating to the 
relevant time period.  Thus, the testimony of Downing, Myers, Decker, and Pietro may 
not relate to the time at issue, and thus may be of little to no probative value.  We 
therefore have limited our findings to that evidence which unambiguously pertains to the 
relevant time frame, although, if we were also to take into account the other testimony, 
as the ALJ may have, we would still affirm his findings. 
 There are distinct questions of fact regarding the boundaries surrounding the 
duties performed by Greco.  While the record and the ALJ’s findings support the 
assertion that he performed the various tasks at issue, the record also reveals strong 
disagreements as to whether he exclusively performed such tasks.  Those issues are 
                                                     
53 Village of Sag Harbor, 49 PERB ¶ 3006 (2016), citing County of Clinton, 47 PERB ¶ 
3026, at 3079 (2014) (quoting Manhasset Union Free Sch Dist, supra note 18, at 3019); 
citing County of Tioga, 44 PERB ¶ 3016, at 3062 (2011); Mount Morris Cent Sch Dist, 
41 PERB ¶ 3020 (2008); City of Rochester, 23 PERB ¶ 3049 (1990); Hempstead 
Housing Auth, 12 PERB ¶ 3054 (1979); Captain's Endowment Assn, 10 PERB ¶ 3034 
(1977)). 
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raised, at the very least, by Perillo’s testimony.  The ALJ chose to credit his testimony 
and if the record were based on that alone, that would be enough to sustain the ALJ’s 
findings that “tracking, monitoring, reporting on and addressing student attendance was 
often a joint effort undertaken by both unit members and nonunit personnel in their 
various roles.”54  Here, unlike in Manhasset Union Free School District, there has been 
a “wholesale commingling of unit” with nonunit members.55   The record reveals that the 
boundaries were murky, and not merely “de minimis exceptions”56 to discernible 
boundaries, and that any such boundaries were not clearly maintained by all parties in 
practice over many years. 
 The ATA has argued that some of the individuals who testified did not have direct 
knowledge of matters and that the credibility of witness Perillo was “strained” when he 
testified regarding truancy “but could not provide specifics.”57  It also objects to 
testimony based on hearsay and characterizes Greco’s testimony as “clear and 
forthright.”58  It raises general concerns that the ALJ based his decision on 
“administrators who had general conversations and meetings about attendance.”59 
 Our rules governing the admission of hearsay are clear: “Except as to the rules of 
privilege recognized by law, compliance with the technical rules of evidence shall not be 
required.”60  Indeed, “hearsay is admissible in an administrative hearing and it can form 
the sole basis for an administrative determination.”61 
                                                     
54 48 PERB ¶ 4522, at 4592. 
55 41 PERB ¶ 3005, at 3027. 
56 41 PERB ¶ 3005, at 3026-3027. 
57 Charging Party’s Brief in Support of Exceptions, at p. 21. 
58 Id., at pp. 17, 24. 
59 Id., at p. 15. 
60 Rules of Procedure, § 212.4(e). 
61 County of Erie, 43 PERB ¶ 3016, 3062 (2010) citing Gray v. Adduci, 73 NY2d  741 
(1988). 
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 In rejecting similar claims raised by a litigant regarding the acceptance of 
hearsay, the Court of Appeals noted: 
The District protests that the testimony of the Union's 
witnesses was incredible and consisted entirely of 
inadmissible hearsay; however, credibility determinations are 
the province of the ALJ, in the first instance, and PERB, not 
us. And the testimony was not hearsay because, as the 
Board observed in its final decision and order, “it relates to 
[the witnesses'] awareness of the practice, rather than the 
truth of the matter asserted” [citation omitted]. Moreover, the 
ALJ was not bound by the rules of evidence, and hearsay 
evidence may properly inform PERB's decisions.62 
 
 We are not faced with a record totally reliant upon hearsay.  The witness Perillo 
and others testified on personal knowledge and the other witnesses, should their 
testimony be credited, bolster that testimony.  The quality of the evidence and other 
issues raised by the ATA go to the credibility of the witness, matters to which we defer 
to the ALJ in the absence of any objective evidence compelling a contrary finding.   
 Finally, we note that as to the preparation of PINS petitions (number 4), the 
District did not contradict that Greco alone performed that task when attendance issues 
were raised.  However, his exclusive performance of that task alone, when weighed 
against and in the context of all the other shared duties, does not establish a discernible 
                                                     
62 Chenango Forks Central Sch Dist v. Pub Empl Rel Bd, 21 NY3d 255, 267 (2013) in 
which it affirmed the Board’s decision in Chenango Forks Central Sch Dist, 43 PERB ¶ 
3017, 3069 (2010) in which we rejected the “contention that the testimony is not reliable 
or probative because the Association failed to present corroborating documentation or 
testimony” and  found: 
 
. . . to the extent that the testimony might constitute hearsay, 
pursuant to § 212.4(e) of our Rules of Procedure (Rules), 
compliance with the technical rules of evidence are not 
required except as those rules apply to evidentiary 
privileges. In any event, hearsay is admissible during our 
administrative hearings and, under appropriate 
circumstances, it can form the sole basis for our decision as 
long as it is sufficiently relevant and probative to constitute 
substantial evidence. 
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boundary between the work performed by the attendance teacher as a unit member and 
the work performed by nonunit employees in the area of student attendance.  We have 
no reason to disturb the ALJ’s conclusions. 
 Based upon the foregoing, we deny the charge and affirm the decision and order 
of the ALJ. 
 IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the charge must be, and hereby is, 
dismissed in its entirety. 
DATED:  April 13, 2016 
               Albany, New York 
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 BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
 This matter comes to us on a request to “rescind or otherwise recall” our decision 
in this matter (Decision)1 filed by the Nassau County Sheriff’s Correction Officer’s 
Benevolent Association (COBA).2  COBA contends that the Decision “should not have 
issued” on the grounds that the parties had, before we issued our Decision, settled the 
dispute “as part of a more global resolution” of issues between the parties.3  The County 
of Nassau (County) questions whether COBA’s charge can be withdrawn after the 
issuance of a decision by an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ), and notes that our 
                                            
1 49 PERB ¶ 3001 (2016). 
2 Letter on behalf of COBA (Reconsideration Letter), February 12, 2016 at 1. 
3 Id. 
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Decision has been relied upon in a contemporaneously issued decision.4  For the 
reasons given below, we deny the request as moot. 
BACKGROUND 
According to COBA, the parties reached a “more global resolution” of issues not 
only between themselves but also with the Nassau Interim Finance Authority (NIFA), 
pursuant to which a wage freeze imposed by NIFA would be lifted as to COBA.  On 
September 11, 2014, COBA sent, through its counsel, a letter addressed to the Board, 
and copied to the Director of Public Employment Practices and Representation 
(Director), as well as adverse counsel.  The letter stated that “[t]oday, our client asked 
that we seek permission to withdraw the above Charge, which is now before the Board, 
with prejudice.  This matter has been resolved between the parties.”5   
Although the County does not deny receiving the September 2014 Withdrawal 
Request, neither the Office of the Chair nor the Director received it.6  Counsel for COBA 
has produced photocopies of the postmarked envelopes in which copies were sent to 
counsel for the County, COBA’s second vice president, and the Director.7  However, a 
diligent search by PERB staff of the files both in the Office of the Chair (which handles 
all correspondence directed to the Board) and the Office of Public Employment 
                                            
4 Letter on behalf of the County, February 16, 2016 (County Response), citing County of 
Suffolk, 49 PERB ¶ 3005 (2016). 
5 Letter on behalf of COBA, September 11, 2014 (Withdrawal Request), attached to 
Reconsideration Letter.  
6 In December 2014, a similar request to withdraw pending exceptions to an ALJ’s 
decision in an improper practice charge, County of Nassau, No. U-30864, was sent via 
email to the Deputy Chair as well as by United States mail.  The Withdrawal Request in 
this case could not be located in either paper or electronic form.    
7 As explained in the Reconsideration letter, “[s]ince [the] negotiations were 
extraordinarily sensitive at the time, as the wage freeze would not have been lifted 
without full compliance, we photocopied the envelopes within which we mailed the letter 
to this Board.  Those and the [Withdrawal Request] letter are attached.”  The only 
attached copy of an envelope mailed to the agency is that addressed to the Director.  
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Practices and Representation (which handles all correspondence addressed to the 
Director) has proven unavailing.  The Board did not respond to the Withdrawal Request, 
and the case was listed on the publicly available agenda for our January 25, 2016 
meeting, at which it considered and decided the case. 
COBA contacted the Office of the Chairperson through the Deputy Chair on 
February 1, 2016, and, pursuant to the Deputy Chair’s request, memorialized its 
grounds for the request in writing on February 12, 2016.  COBA explained that it “is very 
concerned that the value placed on the resolution of this proceeding in those broader 
negotiations will be called into question by NIFA, or otherwise complicate that broader 
agreement.”8   
The County responded on February 16, 2016,9 taking no position on the merits, 
but questioning if the charge can be withdrawn after the decision of an ALJ has issued 
and pointing out that we relied on the Decision in County of Suffolk,10 decided the same 
day.  At no time did the County seek to withdraw its exceptions to the ALJ’s decision. 
DISCUSSION 
     Pursuant to § 204.1 of our Rules of Procedure (Rules), when a charge is pending 
before an ALJ, the “charge may be withdrawn by the charging party before the issuance 
of the dispositive decision and recommended order based thereon upon approval by the 
director.”11  Thereafter, “the improper practice proceeding may be discontinued only 
with the approval of the board.”12  The Rule further provides that requests “to 
                                            
8 Reconsideration Letter at 2. 
9 County Response. 
10 49 PERB ¶ 3005 (2016). 
11 Rules § 204.1.   
12 Id. 
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discontinue an improper practice proceeding will be approved unless to do so would be 
inconsistent with the purposes and policies of the act or due process of law.”13 
 As the Board held in State of New York (State Insurance Department), by “its 
explicit terms, § 204.1(d) of the Rules limits the right of a charging party to unilaterally 
withdraw a charge. Under the Rule, all withdrawal requests are subject to approval and 
will not be approved if it is determined that the withdrawal would be inconsistent with the 
policies of the Act or due process.”14  Moreover, “the Rule does not dictate when a 
charging party must request to withdraw a charge.”15  Thus, as a general matter, the 
Board does have the authority to grant a request for withdrawal after the issuance of an 
ALJ’s decision.    
 However, in this case, the Board did not receive COBA’s letter, and accordingly 
did not decide whether or not to approve the Withdrawal Request.  Rather, we issued 
the Decision in which we reversed the ALJ’s decision, granted the County’s exceptions, 
and dismissed the charge.  We are, therefore, confronted with the question of whether 
we should retroactively allow a withdrawal after the issuance of a Board decision.   
 As noted above, § 201.4 “does not dictate when a charging party must request to 
withdraw a charge.”16  Moreover, in deciding whether to grant a request to withdraw a 
charge, we favor such withdrawals unless the result would be “inconsistent with the 
purposes and policies of the act or due process of law.”17    
 We accept that COBA endeavored in good faith to mail its Withdrawal Request to 
the Board, especially as contemporaneous receipt of a copy is not denied by the 
                                            
13 Id. 
14 45 PERB ¶ 3005, 3009 (2012). 
15 Id. 
16 Id. 
17 Id. 
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County.  However, COBA did not follow up when it received no response to the request 
for over a year, and never alerted the Board to its having mailed the request when the 
matter appeared for decision on the Board’s calendar.  Neither of these acts is 
dispositive of our decision, but weigh in the balance.  While we do not categorically rule 
out the possibility that vacatur of an issued decision based on a withdrawal request 
received after the decision has issued can ever be appropriate, we are, for obvious 
reasons, loath to grant such requests.  We do not believe that the purposes and policies 
of the Act are served by undermining the final and binding nature of our decisions, as 
established by § 213 (a) of the Act.  Therefore, the Board will not lightly vacate an 
issued decision based upon a settlement by the parties.  At a minimum, a significant 
showing of cognizable prejudice must be established, which has not been demonstrated 
here.18    
Pursuant to § 213 (a) of the Act, our Decision dismissing the charge is 
“conclusive against all parties to its proceedings and persons who have had an 
opportunity to be parties to its proceedings.19  Similarly, COBA’s request for withdrawal 
specified that it sought to withdraw the charge “with prejudice.”  A “with prejudice” 
withdrawal constitutes an adjudication on the merits, and, as such, is likewise final and 
                                            
18 We note that, in the instant case, our reasoning for dismissing the charge cannot 
constitute prejudice to COBA, as it is essentially identical to that in County of Nassau,  
48 PERB ¶ 3014 (2015), applying the same contractual provision at issue here to a 
similar claim, which COBA itself sought to have dismissed “with prejudice” in its 
Withdrawal Request.  Thus, neither the outcome nor the reasoning has materially 
changed the legal landscape from that which would pertain if the Withdrawal Request 
had been received and acted upon.   
19 Act, § 213 (a); see, e.g., Allied Chemical v Niagara Mohawk Power Corp, 72 NY2d 
271, 278-279 (1988) (“conclusive and final disposition” of claim by administrative 
agency entitled to preclusive effect; collateral estoppel applied); Ryan v NY Tel Co, 62 
NY2d 494 (1984) (same; claim preclusion or res judicata); Jeffreys v. Griffin, 1 
N.Y.3d 34, 39 (2003) see generally Heller v Bedford Cent Sch Dist, __F Supp 3d ___, 
2015 WL 7288650, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 17, 2015) (collecting cases).  
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binding on the parties, just as is a dismissal on the merits.20  In sum, COBA seeks to 
substitute one form of a “with prejudice” disposition of its claim for another, and has 
been therefore in no way prejudiced by the issuance of the Board’s Decision, which 
reversed that of the ALJ.21      
The Board has “long held that where the issues raised by improper practice 
charges are academic, we do not consider that the policies of the Act would be served 
by our consideration of the charges.”22  Analogously, COBA has raised only academic 
                                            
20 Town of Scriba, 35 PERB ¶ 3011 (2002); see generally Starla D v Jeremy E, 121 
AD3d 1221, 1223 (3d Dept 2014) (“a dismissal ‘with prejudice’ indeed constitutes an 
adjudication on the merits”; subsequent claim precluded) (internal quotation marks and 
citations omitted); Trapani v. Squitieri, 107 A.D.3d 696, 696-697 (2013) (same); Liberty 
Assocs v Etkin, 69 A.D.3d 681, 683 (2d Dept 2010); Jericho Group, Ltd. v. Herzfeld & 
Rubin, P.C., 35 Misc.3d 1225(A), 953 N.Y.S.2d 550 (2012).   
 
We note that in MABSTOA, 40 PERB ¶ 3023, 3095 & n. 16 (2007), the Board stated 
that “strict application of New York or federal civil practice precedent may be 
inappropriate due to the distinct procedures in the Rules along with the public policy 
underlying the Act,” and declined to blanketly apply Scriba as governing all 
circumstances, while also allowing that “[u]nder appropriate circumstances, res 
judicata and collateral estoppel may constitute appropriate bases for dismissing a 
charge.  Either doctrine may be applied to a prior quasi-judicial determination when a 
party has had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issues before the administrative 
agency and the agency utilizes procedures that are substantially similar to those used in 
a court of law.”  Id., (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).  We agree with 
these statements, and note that we do not determine to what extent and under what 
circumstances any given voluntary withdrawal “with prejudice” will be given res judicata 
and/or collateral estoppel effect in future improper practice cases.  We merely note that 
here COBA, by requesting a “with prejudice” withdrawal, sought the functional 
equivalent of a final and binding decision dismissing its claims.   
21 We note that COBA’s expressed concern that NIFA or the County might claim that 
COBA has failed to live up to its obligations under the “more global resolution” that 
prompted the Reconsideration Letter, and seek to abrogate that agreement on such 
grounds.  The County’s response does not take any such position, and indeed, implicitly 
acknowledges that COBA complied with its obligations under “the written agreement of 
the parties.”  We therefore make this determination on the basis that neither the County 
nor NIFA will use this determination as a basis for a claim of breach on the part of 
COBA.  Should such a claim be raised, COBA may seek to renew the request.   
22 East Meadow Union Free School Dist, 48 PERB ¶ 3006, 3018-3019 (2015), quoting  
City of Peekskill, 26 PERB ¶ 3062, 3109 (1993).  
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issues in its Withdrawal Request, and the policies of the Act are not served by 
undermining the finality of our decisions in order to make a purely academic finding.  
The request to vacate or annul our Decision in the Reconsideration Letter is therefore 
denied as moot, and as undermining the finality of our decisions, and thus as 
inconsistent with the purposes and policies of the Act.        
DATED:    April 13, 2016 
       Albany, New York 
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BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by Arelis Candelario to a decision by 
an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) dismissing her charge that Local 372, District 
Council 37, AFSCME, AFL-CIO (DC 37) violated § 209-a.2 (c) of the Public Employees’ 
Fair Employment Act (Act) by declining to pursue to arbitration her termination by the 
Board of Education of the City School District of the City of New York (District) and by 
not responding in a timely manner to her requests.1  Candelario requests as relief that 
                                            
1 48 PERB ¶ 4571 (2015). 
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DC 37 be directed to take her grievance to arbitration.  For the reasons stated herein, 
we affirm the ALJ’s decision, deny the exceptions, and dismiss the charge.  
EXCEPTIONS 
 Candelario excepts to the ALJ’s decision on the grounds that DC 37’s decision 
not to take her case to arbitration was “without merit.”2  She further contends that DC 
37’s “staff did not handle my case in a timely and effective manner,” and asserts that 
were her case to proceed to arbitration, she believes that the termination of her 
employment would be reversed.3  In particular, Candelario asserts that “at no point did 
the [District] accuse [her] of wrongdoing,” characterizing the issue as “strictly one that 
involves communication.”4 
FACTS 
The facts in this matter are more fully stated in the ALJ’s decision, and are only 
set forth here to the extent necessary to resolve the issues raised by the exceptions.  
Candelario was employed by the District in the title school aide and, at the relevant 
times had been assigned to Progress High School for Professional Careers (Progress) 
for approximately eleven years.   In June 2011, three 15-year old female students 
complained of having been subjected to sexual harassment by Assistant Principal 
William Abreu, in the form of inappropriate sexual remarks and questions regarding the 
students’ sexual histories, and of conditioning summer jobs on their provision of sexual 
                                            
2 Exceptions, at 1. 
3 Exceptions, at 1-2. 
4 Exceptions, at 2. 
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favors to him.5  
According to the three students, Candelario, a worker in the school cafeteria, 
approached them as they were leaving the cafeteria, and asked if they were interested 
in obtaining summer jobs.6  The students reported that Candelario had told them that 
Juan Martinez, the founder of the high school and the president of Progress Inc., a non-
profit corporation that shared space with the high school, “had asked her to find three 
girls who wished to work.”7  The students stated that Candelario brought them to 
Martinez’s office.  Martinez, who “appeared to be expecting the students,” spoke of 
summer work, and directed the students to each write an autobiographical essay.8  The 
next day, the three students returned to Martinez’s office, and were directed to interview 
with Abreu.  Abreu met with the students separately, and, the students reported, 
sexually harassed them in the guise of interviewing them.9  
Subsequently, one of the three students reported the incidents to a school safety 
supervisor, who reported it to an Associate Supervisor of School Security, who in turn 
referred the matter to the District’s Special Commissioner of Investigation (SCI).  SCI 
opened an investigation, and interviewed each student three times, as well as Martinez, 
Abreu, and Candelario, among other witnesses. 
                                            
5 Report of the Special Commissioner of Investigation for the New York City School 
District (SCI Report), Joint Exhibit 2, at 1, 2-5.  Abreu’s termination was upheld against 
a challenge pursuant to Article 75 of the Civil Practice Law and Rules.  Abreu v NYC 
Dept of Education, 43 Misc3d 1215(A), 2014 NY Slip Op 50647(U) (Sup Ct NY Co 
2014) (Lobis, J). 
6 SCI Report at 2. 
7 Id.; see also Abreu v NYC Dept of Education, 43 Misc3d 1215(A) at *1.  
8 Id at 4, 2. 
9 Id at 2. 
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The three students reported to SCI that in September 2011, Candelario 
approached them.  One stated that Candelario “approached her and asked whether she 
had spoken to her parents or told anybody about what Abreu had said to her [the 
student].”10  This student, denominated Student A in the SCI’s June 20, 2012 report to 
the Chancellor (SCI Report), told one of the other students (Student B in the SCI 
Report) about Candelario’s inquiry and warned her not to speak to Candelario.  Student 
B reported to SCI that Candelario had also “asked her what had happened with Abreu 
and tried to get information concerning their meeting” from her, as well as telling 
Student B that the job prospects were for the students’ parents, not the students 
themselves, contrary to Student B’s understanding.11  The third student (Student C) 
likewise told SCI that in September 2011, Candelario “approached her as she held a 
mobile telephone in her hand and asked ‘What happened with Abreu?  What happened 
with the investigation?’”12   
According to the SCI Report, Martinez in his interview stated that Candelario 
referred the three students to him.  Martinez stated to investigators that he asked if the 
students were interested in summer jobs, and when they said that they were, referred 
them to Abreu for interviews. 
The SCI Report described the investigators’ interactions with Candelario: 
After interviewing Martinez, SCI investigators returned to 
Candelario, who previously told them that she did not recall 
                                            
10 SCI Report at 3 (internal quotation marks omitted).   
11 Id at 5.  Student A recalled Student B describing such a conversation with Candelario 
the day after Student A warned her not to talk with her.  Id. at 4. 
12 Id. 
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discussing summer jobs with Student A, Student B, or 
Student C, and that she was unaware of such job 
possibilities.  In the second interview, Candelario said that 
she “now recall[ed]” discussing summer jobs with the 
students in the cafeteria.  However, Candelario claimed that 
Student A, Student B, and Student C came to her and 
inquired about jobs, contrary to their accounts that 
Candelario initiated the discussion.  Candelario 
acknowledged that she directed the students to Martinez, 
whom she knew hired students for summer jobs.  In a third 
interview with investigators, Candelario continued to 
maintain that the students approached her about jobs, rather 
than the reverse.  She acknowledged that she escorted the 
students to Martinez’s office.  Candelario told investigators 
that she “misspoke” when she previously stated that 
Martinez hired students for summer jobs, and that she meant 
to say that “kids go [to Martinez] to get applications for jobs.” 
. . . . 
 
Contrary to the accounts of Student A, Student B, and 
Student C, Candelario claimed that she did not speak with 
any of these students in September 2011 regarding Abreu.13 
 
Citing these discrepancies, the SCI Report concluded that Candelario “lied to 
investigators and sought to mislead them concerning her communications with the three 
students, whose accounts flatly contradict Candelario,” and recommended the 
termination of her employment.14  Effective June 20, 2012—the date of the SCI 
Report—the District suspended Candelario without pay, and, for the first time, she 
contacted DC 37 about the matter.  DC 37 filed a grievance challenging Candelario’s 
suspension on June 22, 2012.15    
After a Step II grievance hearing held on September 19, 2012, at which DC 37 
                                            
13 SCI Report at 6 (editing marks other than ellipses in original). 
14 Id at 8. 
15 Joint Exhibit 3.  
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represented her, the principal issued a letter bearing that date, which did not adopt the 
SCI Report’s recommendation, but instead concluded that: “in light of your limited 
English speaking ability, your failure to secure union representation and a translator, 
and your inability to adequately defend yourself during multiple questionings, that you 
not be dismissed from you employment and be made ineligible to work.”16  The 
principal’s letter added that SCI had recommended termination, and that, “as such, the 
[District] retain[ed] the right to further disciplinary action.17  The principal made no other 
finding as to the appropriate penalty, and Candelario continued on suspension without 
pay.   
DC 37 pursued the matter on behalf of Candelario and represented her through 
the October 11, 2012 step III decision finding that the principal had properly suspended 
Candelario without pay during the investigation and dismissing the grievance.18  After 
the step III decision, the DC 37 representative who had represented Candelario 
informed her that her case would be assessed by an attorney to determine if it would be 
taken to arbitration.  On October 17, 2012, DC 37 timely filed a request for arbitration.19   
On February 28, 2013, after she had repeatedly enquired as to the status of her 
case, Candelario met with Robin Roach, at that time an Assistant General Counsel for 
DC 37.  Roach and Candelario reviewed the SCI Report, and Candelario had the 
                                            
16 Charging Party Exhibit 1, at 2. 
17 Id (editing marks added). 
18 Joint Exhibit 7.   
19 Joint Exhibit 6.  
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chance to provide her account of the events, along with supporting evidence.20   
In late August 2013, Candelario returned to DC 37’s offices where Roach told her 
that DC 37 would not pursue her case to arbitration.  Subsequently, Candelario received 
a letter dated September 12, 2013, from Myrna Cabranes, DC 37’s Assistant Director 
for Schools Division, confirming that DC 37’s “General Council has concluded that your 
case will not proceed to arbitration.”21  Cabranes’ letter enclosed an August 29, 2013 
memorandum by Roach explaining the reasons why DC 37 declined to pursue 
arbitration of Candelario’s grievance.  In particular, the memorandum stated:  
While Ms. Candelario did not participate in the “interviews” 
Abreu conducted with each student, her reaction to the SCI 
investigators’ visit do not correspond to her request for union 
representation.  It is inexplicable that despite the fact that 
she asserted her right to union representation on more than 
one occasion, she failed to reach out to her union 
representative at any time.  She informed counsel that she 
went about her affairs after each visit from the investigator.   
 
The grievant’s memory lapse with respect to the second visit 
strains credulity.  Asked by this counsel whether she had 
any prior disagreements with any of the students, Ms. 
Candelario denied any such occurrence, but was unable to 
give a reason for the students to implicate her in allegations 
if inappropriate student contact. 
 
The grievant relied upon the decision of the principal who 
cites her limited ability to communicate in English, and the 
fact that she was not [re]presented by Union as reasons for 
her to retain her position.  However, given the thoroughness 
of the SCI investigations (including interviewing each 
complaining students three times) and the grievant’s failure 
to contact the Union, as well as the inconsistencies between 
her statements and the students, the employer would be 
                                            
20 Tr, at pp. 50-51.  
21 Joint Exhibit 5.  
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able to meet its burden of proving good and sufficient reason 
to discipline her. 22  
 
Candelario testified that she “felt discriminated [against] because [she] didn’t 
know English,”23 and that DC 37 had taken too long to advise her that it would not 
proceed to arbitration.   
On November 18, 2013, the principal held another meeting with Candelario, at 
which DC 37 represented her. On December 6, 2013, the principal terminated 
Candelario’s employment by letter.24   On February 17, 2014, DC 37 filed a step II 
grievance challenging Candelario’s termination, and represented her at the March 36, 
2014 step II hearing.25 On March 31, 2103, the step II hearing officer grievance denied 
the grievance.   
DISCUSSION 
The Board has often reaffirmed that “to establish a breach of the duty of fair 
representation under the Act, a charging party has the burden of proof to demonstrate 
that an employee organization’s conduct or actions are arbitrary, discriminatory or 
founded in bad faith.”26   
 As we recently pointed out, the courts have: 
                                            
22 Joint Exhibit 4.  
23 Tr, at pp. 28-29. 
24 Charging Party Exhibit 5. 
25 Charging Party Exhibit 4. 
26 UFT (Cruz), 48 PERB ¶ 3004, 3010, petition denied, Cruz v NYS Pub Empl Relations 
Bd, 48 PERB ¶ 7003 (2015) (internal quotation and editing marks omitted), quoting  
UFT (Munroe), 47 PERB ¶ 3031, 3095 (2014), petition denied, 48 PERB ¶ 7002 (Sup Ct 
NY Co 2015) (quoting CSEA (Bienko), 47 PERB ¶ 3027, 3082-3083 (2014)); see 
District Council 37, AFSCME, AFL-CIO (Farrey), 41 PERB ¶ 3027, 3119 (2008). 
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reject[ed] the standard . . . that “irresponsible or grossly 
negligent” conduct may form the basis for a union' s breach 
of the duty of fair representation as not within the meaning of 
improper employee organization practices set forth in Civil 
Service Law § 209-a. An honest mistake resulting from 
misunderstanding or lack of familiarity with matters of 
procedure does not rise to the level of the requisite arbitrary, 
discriminatory or bad-faith conduct required to establish an 
improper practice by the union.27 
 
 Moreover, it is “well-settled that an employee organization is entitled to a wide 
range of reasonable discretion in the processing of grievances under the Act.”28  In 
particular, “an employee's mere disagreement with the tactics utilized or dissatisfaction 
with the quality or extent of representation does not constitute a breach of the duty of 
fair representation.”29 
 Candelario has not provided any basis upon which we could conclude that the 
representation was tainted by any “arbitrary, discriminatory or bad-faith conduct” 
sufficient to violate the duty of fair representation. Here, Candelario claims that DC 37 
breached its duty of fair representation to her by declining to proceed to arbitration on 
her behalf, and that it delayed too long in making the decision not to do so.   
 To take the latter claim first, as the ALJ correctly noted, DC 37’s filing a request 
for arbitration preserved its ability to pursue arbitration on her behalf after it completed 
its evaluation.  Therefore, DC 37’s delay in responding to Candelario’s request that it 
                                            
27 Id., quoting Cairo-Durham Teachers Assn, 47 PERB ¶ 3008, 3026 (2014) 
(quoting CSEA, L 1000 v NYS Pub Empl Relations Bd (Diaz), 132 AD 2d 430, 432, 20 
PERB ¶ 7024, 7039 (3d Dept 1987), affd on other grounds, 73 NY2d 796, 21 PERB ¶ 
7017 (1988)). 
28 UFT (Gibson), 48 PERB ¶ 3015 (2015) (quoting CSEA (Munroe), 47 PERB ¶ 3031, at 
3095, citing Amalg Transit Union, Local 1056 (Lefevre), 43 PERB ¶ 3027, 3104 (2010). 
29 Id. 
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bring her grievance to arbitration has not been shown to have had prejudiced her 
interests in any way. 
Likewise, the record does not support a finding that the decision to not advance 
Candelario’s grievance to arbitration breached the duty of fair representation.  DC 37’s 
Legal Department evaluated Candelario’s grievance, and found that Candelario’s own 
inconsistent statements to investigators, and the fact that her account of events was 
inconsistent with that of multiple other witnesses meant that “the employer would be 
able to meet its burden of proving good and sufficient reason to discipline her.”   
 Moreover, DC 37 found Candelario’s own credibility questionable, pointing to the 
disjuncture between her repeated invocation to investigators of her right to union 
representation and her failure to contact the union and exercise that right.  Here, as was 
the case in UFT (Barnes), while Candelario does not agree with DC 37’s “assessment 
of the viability of [her] case at arbitration, [she] has not established that it was arbitrary, 
discriminatory or reached in bad faith.”30  Indeed, Calendario does not address, let 
alone dispute, the factors relied upon by DC 37 in assessing the merits of her 
grievance, and whether it should be advanced to arbitration.  Rather, she has asserted 
only that the principal’s initial letter declining to terminate her employment based on her 
difficulties in representing herself in multiple meetings with the investigators from SCI 
would provide a potential basis upon which the case against her could be undermined.  
Assuming that such is the case, and that rationale could outweigh the concerns raised 
by Roach in her memorandum, Candelario “would have at most asserted ‘an honest 
                                            
30 48 PERB ¶ 3017, 3059 (2015). 
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mistake resulting from misunderstanding,’ insufficient to constitute a breach of the duty 
of fair representation.”31 
 Likewise, the ALJ acted within her discretion in rejecting Candelario’s claim that 
DC 37 discriminated against her based upon her lack of English language proficiency.  
As the ALJ correctly found, this allegation was entirely conclusory in nature, and was 
“insufficient to plead, let alone prove, a violation of the duty of fair representation.”32  
Indeed, the fact that DC 37 provided Calendario with a translator at her meeting with 
Roach runs contrary to her claim, and no evidence to support the claim was adduced.  
 Based upon the foregoing, we deny Candelario’s charge and affirm the decision 
of the ALJ. 
  IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the charge must be, and hereby is, 
dismissed in its entirety. 
DATED:  April 13, 2016 
               Albany, New York 
                                            
31 Id, quoting CSEA (Munroe), 47 PERB ¶ 3031, at 3096; see also Cairo-Durham 
Teachers Assn, 47 PERB ¶ 3008 at 3026, citing CSEA (Kandel), 13 PERB ¶ 3049 
(1980). 
32 Elwood Teachers Alliance (Neithardt), 48 PERB ¶ 3020, text at n. 31 (2015) (quoting 
UFT (Leon), 48 PERB ¶ 3016, at 3056 (quoting UFT (Munroe), 47 PERB ¶ 3031, at 
3095 (citing PEF (Goonewardena), 27 PERB ¶ 3006 (1994)); see also UFT 
(Arredondo), 48 PERB ¶ 3010, 3034 (2015) (same). 
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BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
 This case comes to us on a motion filed by charging party Jonathan Scott Harper, 
proceeding pro se, in which he seeks leave to file an interlocutory appeal to a ruling by an 
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) that effectively dismissed a portion of his amended 
improper practice charge against Civil Service Employees Association, Local 1000, 
AFSCME, AFL-CIO (CSEA).  The amended charge asserts that CSEA violated § 209-a (2) 
of the Public Employees’ Fair Employment Act (Act) by breaching its duty of fair 
representation to Harper.   
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 At the hearing, before Harper began presenting his direct case, the ALJ informed the 
parties that “in light of the four month statute of limitations, as set forth in [our Rules of 
Procedure (Rules)], I’m unable to find a violation regarding events that occurred” more 
than four months prior to the filing of the charge.1  Accordingly, the ALJ requested that 
Harper “focus his testimony on that aspect of the charge that would, in fact, be timely.”2  
The ALJ further stated that testimony regarding actions on the part of CSEA that took 
place outside of the four-month statute of limitations would be admitted as background 
information, bearing upon the history between the parties.3  Harper did not at that time 
object to the ALJ’s direction.4 
 Harper’s proposed interlocutory exceptions contend that the ALJ erred in implicitly 
dismissing his claims based on acts or omissions by CSEA which took place more than 
four months prior to the filing of the charge.  Harper argues that, pursuant to § 212.4 (l) of 
our Rules, the ALJ can dismiss a charge on the basis of timeliness at the hearing “only if 
the failure of timeliness was first revealed during the hearing.”5     
DISCUSSION 
 We find that Harper has not established extraordinary circumstances warranting 
consideration by this Board of an appeal of a non-final ruling, and deny the request to file 
exceptions without prejudice to Harper’s bringing the issues raised therein before the 
Board in an appeal from a final order of the ALJ.   
                                                     
1 Tr, at p 22; see generally Rules §204.1 (a)(1). 
2 Id. 
3 Tr, at pp 23-24. 
4 Id. 
5 Request for Exceptions, at 1, quoting Rules § 212.4 (l).  The Rule continues to state that 
“An objection to the timeliness of the charge, if not duly raised, shall be deemed waived.”  
Id.  CSEA in its answer did assert as its first defense that the charge was, at least in part, 
untimely.  Ans, ¶¶ 29-30. 
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 The Board has consistently held that “leave to file interlocutory exceptions to non-final 
rulings and decisions, pursuant to § 212.4 of the Rules,” will only be granted “in situations 
where the moving party demonstrates extraordinary circumstances.”6    As the Board 
explained in CSEA (Arredondo): 
It is more efficient for us and the parties to await a final 
disposition of the merits of a charge before examining 
interim determinations. The grant of interlocutory exceptions 
results in delays in the final resolution of the factual and legal 
issues raised by an improper practice charge or 
representation petition. Therefore, we have rejected most 
requests for permission to file exceptions, especially motions 
seeking review of interim rulings in improper practice cases.7 
  
Here, Harper has not established extraordinary circumstances.  Indeed, he has not 
established prejudice, as the ALJ has allowed him to submit evidence regarding the 
events outside of the limitations period, nor has he as yet preserved the issue for appeal 
by raising the issue before the ALJ.  Accordingly, we deny the request to file exceptions 
without prejudice to Harper’s bringing the issues raised therein before the Board in an 
appeal from a final order of the ALJ. 
 DATED:  April 13, 2016 
               Albany, New York 
 
       
                                                     
6 Bd of Educ, City Sch Dist City of NY (Grassel), 41 PERB ¶ 3016, 3080 (2008), citing 
State of NY (Division of Parole), 40 PERB ¶ 3007 (2007); UFT (Grassel), 32 PERB ¶ 3071 
(1999). 
7 43 PERB ¶ 3021, 3080-3081 (2010). 
